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Abstract
The theory of by-production of emissions and capital-constrained
non-cooperative Nash outcomes of a global economy.
The reduced form approaches that are commonly adopted in the literature to model
emission-generating technologies (EGTs) do not distinguish between emission-causing and
non-emission causing goods in production. We provide a new set of axioms to describe
EGTs. Technologies that satisfy these axioms are called by-production technologies (BPTs).
A distance function representation of BPTs is derived and it is shown that a BPT can
be decomposed into a standard neo-classical intended-production technology and nature’s
emission-generation set (the relationship in nature between emissions and emission-causing
goods). As an illustrative application of the BP approach, we study cross-country diﬀer-
ences in emission levels due to cross-country diﬀerences in capital endowments at a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium, where emissions impose both local and global externalities.
The change in emission levels as we move from capital-poor to capital-rich countries is
decomposed into income and substitution eﬀects. The latter are a result of changes in
the trade-oﬀ between intended-production and emission-generation, which is attributed to
diminishing returns to emission-causing inputs or cleaning-up activities, while the nature
of the former is governed by the assumption that emission is an inferior good. The implica-
tions of increasing returns to capital, substitutability or complementarity between capital
and emission-causing inputs such as fuels, extraction costs of fuels, and inter-fuel substi-
tution in production are studied and a set of conditions that result in an environmental
Kuznets curve is derived. JEL classiﬁcation codes: Q50, Q56, Q51, O10, O12, D20, D62,
D11. Keywords: distance function representation of multi-output technology, emission-
generating technologies, free and costly disposability, environmental Kuznets curve, en-
vironmental externalities, non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, income and substitution ef-
fects, inferior good, returns to scale, inter-fuel substitution.
July 20, 2011The theory of by-production of emissions and capital-constrained non-cooperative Nash outcomes of a global economy. (S. Murty) July 20, 2011
The theory of by-production of emissions and
capital-constrained non-cooperative Nash outcomes of a global economy.
1. Introduction.
A model of an emission-generating technology (EGT) should distinguish between pro-
duction of intended outputs by ﬁrms and the generation of emissions, which are the unin-
tended outputs. In nature, emissions are caused by certain goods under certain physical
or chemical conditions. These emission-causing goods could form a part of the intended
production activities of a ﬁrm either as inputs1 or as intended outputs.2 Intended pro-
duction by ﬁrms, hence, triggers the physical and chemical reactions that are conducive
for emission generation in nature, and generates emissions as by-products. Murty, Rus-
sell, and Levkoﬀ (MRL) [2011] have called this simultaneity in the processes of intended
production by ﬁrms and emission generation by nature that arises because of the use or
production of emission-causing goods by ﬁrms as by-production (BP). Abatement (or re-
duction) of emissions involves either (i) reducing the scale of intended production, which
reduces the use or production of goods that cause emissions in nature or (ii) diverting a
part of the ﬁrm’s resources (inputs) into explicit production of cleaning-up activities, such
as operating end-of-pipe (eﬄuent) treatment plants, use of scrubbers, aﬀorestation, etc.
In contrast, barring a few recent exceptions, much of the theoretical and applied
literature concerned with emission generation takes a reduced form approach to model the
relationship between intended outputs of ﬁrms and emission generation.3
1 E.g., coal.
2 E.g., certain varieties of cheese that liberate strong odours as emissions.
3 Exceptions include MRL, Førsund [2009], and Coelli, Lauwers, and Van Huylenbroeck [2007]. Some
of these papers are motivated by the work of Nobel laureate Ragnar Frisch [1965], who showed that there
are many instances of production when more than one production relation may be required to model a
production technology, while others are motivated by the the material balance approach of Ayres and
Kneese [1969].
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The ﬁrst is a partial-equilibrium welfare approach, where the reduced form relation
between emissions and intended outputs of ﬁrms excludes explicit or implicit mention of
goods that cause emissions in nature. In many such papers, the basic idea is that there is an
initial endowment of a numeraire commodity which can potentially be allocated between
an aggregate measure of abatement activities and consumption. The more the numeraire
is allocated to abatement the less is available for good consumption, and hence the positive
relation between emission levels and the level of “good” consumption.4 A motivation for
these works is to study, design, and compare welfare improving environmental policies
within a partial-equilibrium framework.
The second is an approach motivated by measurement issues such as measuring the
consequences of emission generation on technical eﬃciency, growth, productivity, etc., and
assessment of shadow values of emissions. A motivation for these works is to provide
inputs to governmental agencies for setting the right levels of policy instruments and
targets to regulate emission-generating units. Models of technologies in this approach are
described in the space of all inputs, intended outputs, and emissions. Nonetheless, they
continue to be reduced form speciﬁcations, as they do not attribute emissions to inputs
or intended outputs that cause emissions in nature. Rather, the positive relationship
between emissions and intended outputs is explained in terms of abatement (in particular,
cleaning-up) activities of ﬁrms, which are not modeled explicitly. It is recognized in this
literature that, unlike in the case of the intended outputs, the technology does not satisfy
output free disposability with respect to emissions. To obtain the reduced-form positive
relation between emission generation and intended production, emissions are either treated
4 See, e.g., the text book on environmental economics by Kolstad [2000]. Among other several notable
examples is the classic paper by Weitzman [1974].
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as inputs (the input approach)5 or as weakly disposable outputs (the output approach).6
MRL show that models of EGT in the measurement approach exhibit trade-oﬀs among
inputs, intended outputs, and emissions which are intuitively unacceptable.7 MRL show
that a technology obtained as a composition of two technologies: (a) an intended pro-
duction technology and (b) nature’s emission-generation mechanism, generates all the
intuitively expected trade-oﬀs between various goods. MRL do not however provide a
complete characterization of the composite technology. It is the overall technology, and
not its individual components (a) and (b), that we observe empirically. Modeling the
overall technology requires substantial a-priori knowledge of its properties.
This brings us to the ﬁrst of the two main objectives of this paper: we introduce
a new set of axioms for an EGT. Any technology that satisﬁes these axioms is called
a by-production technology (BPT). These axioms include standard output or input free
disposability of all (including emission-causing) intended outputs and non-emission causing
inputs. The emission-causing inputs and cleaning-up activity of the ﬁrm on the other
hand satisfy more complex disposability assumptions, which we call conditional costly
disposability. It is shown that this new set of axioms lend themselves to a very convenient
functional representation of a BPT. Since we are dealing with technologies producing
multiple outputs (intended and unintended), the most convenient functional representation
is oﬀered by the use of distance functions.8 Since this paper introduces a completely new
5 See, e.g., Baumol and Oates [1988], Cropper and Oates [1992], Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijhssen [1999],
and Reinhard, Lovell, and Geert [2000].
6 See, e.g., F¨ are, Grosskopf, Noh, and Yaisawarng [1993], Coggins and Swinton [1994], Hailu and Vee-
man [1999], Murty and Kumar [2002, 2003], F¨ are, Grosskopf, Lovell, and Pasurka [1989], F¨ are, Grosskopf,
Noh, and Weber [2005], and Boyd and McClelland [1999]. See Zhou and Poh [2008] for a comprehensive
survey of over a hundred papers employing this approach.
7 See also Murty [2010b] for an example that demonstrates this, e.g., it is possible in these models to
observe a negative relation between emissions and an emission-causing input such as coal. This is precisely
because these works do not model the link in nature between emissions and the emission-causing goods
used or produced in intended production.
8 Also called gauge functions or transformation functions in the literature, the use of distance functions
is common in production theory since their introduction by Malmquist [1953] and Shephard [1953]. They
have been extensively studied in the works of Gorman [1970], Blackorby, Russell, and Primont [1978],
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set of axioms to characterize EGTs, the functional representations obtained here are novel
and quite diﬀerent from those in the existing literature.9 In particular, two distance
functions are derived from an arbitrarily given BPT, one capturing the upper bounds on
intended outputs and the other capturing the lower bounds on emission generation in
nature. It is shown that a production vector belongs to a BPT if and only if both these
distance functions, evaluated at this production point, take a value less than or equal to
one. Properties of these two distance functions are carefully derived and it is shown that,
by employing these two implicit functions, one can decompose the associated BPT into
its underlying intended production technology and the nature’s emission generation set.
Further, intersection of technologies represented by any arbitrary pair of implicit functions
possessing the same properties as the new distance functions that we have deﬁned, results
in a BPT. Thus, our new set of axioms provide both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
decomposition of an EGT into its underlying intended production and emission generation
components. This forms the agenda of Sections 2 to 5. The model of technology that we
consider in these sections is very general: it allows for emissions of a producing unit to
impose beneﬁcial or detrimental external eﬀects on its own intended production, and it
allows for cases where there is a jointness in the production of multiple emissions.
The second objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the BP approach to modeling
EGT leads to far richer sets of results and explanations to empirically observed economic
phenomenon than those derived from the partial-equilibrium welfare approach. The more
elaborate speciﬁcation of an EGT in the BP approach enables one to move towards a
general equilibrium framework, where many pertinent economic laws can be conveniently
Fuss and McFadden [1978], F¨ are and Primont [1995], etc., and applied in many areas of economics such
as index number theory (construction of technical eﬃciency, productivity, and cost of living indexes) and
the theory of optimal taxation in public economics (see Deaton [1979]). For an excellent discussion and
survey of the concept and its applications see Russell [1998].
9 In the existing literature, distance function representations are primarily based on the assumptions
of weak disposability and null jointness employed in the output approach to emissions.
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modeled into the problem. We hope to demonstrate the richness of the results that can
be derived from the BP approach through one application of this approach.
There is a large empirical and partial-equilibrium based theoretical literature that
seeks to measure and explain cross-country diﬀerences in emission generation. Primarily,
these diﬀerences are associated with the cross-country diﬀerences in the level of economic
development. Guesnerie [2008] explains diﬀerences in emission choices of countries in terms
of diﬀerences in preferences: globally, over the entire consumption set, developed coun-
tries value environment more than less developed countries. The environmental Kuznets
curve phenomenon, which depicts an inverted U shape relationship between an indicator
of economic development and various emissions has been tested by many applied pa-
pers.10 A large theoretical literature seeks to ﬁnd restrictions on the technologies and
preferences that are consistent with this phenomenon. Under the restrictions imposed by
these models, cross-country diﬀerences in the endowment of a numeraire commodity may
imply technological or institutional bottlenecks for poorly endowed countries, resulting in
higher opportunity costs of abatement in these countries, to which is attributed their lower
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for emission reductions and higher emission levels.11
The reduced form speciﬁcation of technology in these models precludes any link between
emissions and emission-causing goods seen in nature. Many interesting features regard-
ing the process of emission reduction as we move from poor to rich countries are hence
missed out. In contrast, our BP approach allows us to model all aspects of neoclassical
production theory, such as the economic law of diminishing returns, as well as nature’s
emission-generating mechanism. It also allows us to model a rich set of production fea-
tures which are realistic and pertinent to the question at hand, such as extraction costs of
emission-causing (fuel) inputs, inter-fuel diﬀerences in emission intensity, the possibility of
10 See, e.g., Grossman and Krueger [1995] and Mason and Swanson [2001] and the references therein.
11 See, e.g., Stokey [1998], Jones and Manuelli [2001], Andreoni and Levinson [2001], and Israel and
Levinson [2004].
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complementarity between the use of capital equipment and fuel, and the possibility that
there could be non-decreasing returns to capital. The most general of such models could
however be quite intractable for analysis. However, there is a minimalistic model, where
each of these features can be minimally represented to form a part of a tractable analysis.
This is the approach we adopt in this paper. In our simple illustrative application in Sec-
tion 6, we study a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of a static global economy in autarky
where an emission imposes both a local and a global externality and where countries are
identical in all respects (technologies, preferences, and labor endowments) but one: their
endowment of a resource that we call capital, which is an important input into produc-
tion. The aim is to study to what extent the sheer diﬀerences in the availability of a key
productive factor can help explain cross-country diﬀerences in emissions. Combined with
the assumption that emission is an inferior good, the BP approach to this problem yields
the following conclusions at a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the global economy:
(1) For any country, the consumption trade-oﬀ (or the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS)) between intended output and emission is equated to the trade-oﬀs in production
between the intended output and emission.
(2) For any country, the trade-oﬀs in production between intended-production and emis-
sion generation (or the opportunity costs of reducing emissions) are equalized across all
abatement strategies, (e.g., trade-oﬀs resulting from changes in the level of cleaning-up
activity or changes in the level of fuel usage, are all equal).
(3) As we move from capital-poor to capital-rich countries, the changes in levels of
emission and the intended output can be decomposed into income and substitution eﬀects.
The substitution eﬀects arise because the MRS can change as the capital level changes.
The change in the MRS is attributed to diminishing returns to fuel inputs or cleaning-
up activity. Substitution eﬀects vanish if there are no such diminishing returns. Income
eﬀects arise because the increase in capital can result in an increase in real income, which
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is given by the net marginal product of capital – the contribution of the additional capital
input to intended production net of the extraction cost of fuel needed to run the additional
capital.
(4) If the use of capital is not fuel intensive, i.e., capital and fuel inputs are not perfect
complements, then as capital increases, it acts as a substitute for fuel inputs in intended
production. The use of fuel inputs decreases and diminishing returns implies increased
productivity of fuel inputs and hence higher MRS. Substitution eﬀects, hence, involve
greater emission and greater intended production. However, as real income also increases
with increase in capital and because emission (resp., intended output) is an inferior (resp.,
normal) good, the income eﬀects imply lower emission and higher intended output pro-
duction. We show that the income eﬀects dominate the substitution eﬀects: emission
(resp., intended output) level decreases (resp., increases) as we move from capital-poor
to capital-rich countries. In particular, if there are no diminishing returns to fuel inputs
or cleaning-up activity, then the MRS will not change as we move from capital-poor to
capital-rich countries, though the emission level decreases. Contrast this with the earlier
literature, where poor countries are invariably associated with higher MRS (lower MWTP
for emission reduction) than the rich countries.
(5) If the use of capital is fuel intensive then, if (i) increasing returns to capital is true,
(ii) the net marginal product of capital takes negative values for low levels of capital and
positive values for high levels of capital, and (iii) the substitution eﬀects are negligible,
then an environmental Kuznets curve phenomenon arises at a non-cooperative Nash equi-
librium: there is an inverted U (resp., U) shape relation between capital and emission
(resp., intended output) levels. The appearance of an environmental Kuznets curve at a
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in our analysis, implies that there exists a critical level
of capital such that countries with capital endowment less than the critical amount can-
not reap dividends from increasing returns to capital. Rather, in such countries, a large
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amount of resources have to be diverted away from intended production towards extraction
of fuel needed for running the capital so that it is possible that the net marginal product
of capital is negative. Moreover, with no substitution eﬀects, this is true with the MRS
being the same across all countries.
(6) Under constant elasticity of inter-fuel substitution, substitution eﬀects depend only
on the fuel ratio. The fuel ration is independent of the level of capital and depends on
both the marginal extraction costs of the fuels and their relative emission intensities. The
ratio of a cleaner to a dirtier fuel is greater than one if the dirtier fuel’s cost of extraction
is also higher than the cleaner fuel. This ratio is lower the lower is the relative extraction
cost of the dirtier fuel. There is a threshold extraction cost of the dirtier fuel below which
the equilibrium ratio is lesser than one.
We conclude in Section 7. Several diagrams and examples have been employed
throughout the paper to explain our constructs, axioms, and special cases of our results.
All proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
2. A model of by-production.
Our by-production model of an EGT has the following components:
• m intended outputs, of which those indexed 1,...,mz (with mz ≤ m) cause emissions
and the remaining mo = m − mz do not. A quantity vector of intended outputs is
denoted by y =  yz,yo  ∈ Rm
+. Intended outputs are indexed by j, e.g., yzj is the
quantity of the jth emission-causing output.
• n inputs, of which those indexed 1,...,nz (with nz ≤ n) cause emissions and the
remaining no = n − nz do not. A quantity vector of inputs is denoted by x =
 xz,xo  ∈ Rn
+. Inputs are indexed by i, e.g., xzi is the quantity of the ith emission-
causing input.
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• m′ types of emissions. A quantity vector of emissions is denoted by z ∈ Rm′
+ . Emis-
sions are indexed by k, e.g., zk is the quantity of the kth emission.
• A cleaning-up output, whose quantity is denoted by a ∈ R+.
An EGT is a set of production vectors of the form  x,a,y,z  =  xz,xo,a,yz,yo,z  ∈
Rn+m+m′+1
+ and is denoted by T ⊂ Rn+m+m′+1
+ . Restrictions of T to various subspaces
are denoted by P( ), e.g., P(x,a,z) ⊂ Rm
+ is the restriction of T to the space of all intended
outputs given a ﬁxed quantity vector  x,a,z  of all other goods. Similarly, P(x,a,y) ⊂ Rm′
+
is the restriction of T to the space of all emissions given a ﬁxed quantity vector  x,a,y 
of all other goods.
Given a ﬁxed amount of all inputs and cleaning-up activity, there are bounds on both
the levels of intended outputs and emissions that are technologically feasible. In particular,
it is reasonable to assume that there is an upper bound on intended production and a lower
bound on emission generation.12 The latter reﬂects the fact that it is costly to reduce
emissions below such a lower bound. Technical ineﬃciency may imply that less intended
outputs are produced (resp. more emissions are generated) than the levels indicated by the
tightest upper bounds (resp. lower bounds) on intended outputs (resp. emissions). One
can also envisage upper bounds on emission generation, but if emissions impose detrimental
external eﬀects on (other) agents in the economy, then economic eﬃciency implies that
we are more interested in the lower bounds on emission generation. Thus, we derive the
costly-disposal hull T of the EGT T as
T ≡ T +
 




T includes all production vectors in T as well as production vectors that generate arbi-
trarily higher levels of emissions than those permitted by T . Thus, if  x,a,y,z  ∈ T then
12 E.g., a given amount of coal can generate a certain maximum amount of electricity and a certain
minimum amount of smoke.
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 x,a,y,z′  ∈ T for all z′ ≥ z.13 Restrictions of T to various subspaces are denoted by
P( ).
Let z−k denote a (m′ −1)-dimensional quantity vector of all types of emissions other




 x,a  ∈ Rn+1
+
 
  ∃  y,z  ∈ Rm+m′
+ such that  x,a,y,z  ∈ T
 
.
Ω is the set of all vectors  x,a  of input quantities and cleaning-up levels for which there
is some intended production and emission generation, i.e., for which P(x,a)  = ∅. Given
the above deﬁnitions and notation, Remark 1 follows in an obvious way:
Remark 1: Construction of T from T implies that
• P(x,a) ⊆ P(x,a) for all  x,a  ∈ Ω,
• Ω =
 
 x,a  ∈ Rn+1
+
 
  P(x,a)  = ∅
 
, and
• for all  x,a,y  ∈ Ω×Rm
+, we have P(x,a,y) = P(x,a,y)+Rm′
+ = P(x,a,y)+Rm′
+ .14
For all  x,a  ∈ Ω, deﬁne the sets
Y(x,a) := {y ∈ Rm
+
 
   y,z  ∈ P(x,a) for some z ∈ Rm′
+ },
Z(x,a) := {z ∈ Rm′
+
 
   y,z  ∈ P(x,a) for some y ∈ Rm
+}, and
Z(x,a) := {z ∈ Rm′
+
 
   y,z  ∈ P(x,a) for some y ∈ Rm
+}.
13 Vector notation: for any two vectors a =  a1,...,an  and b =  b1,...,bn  in an arbitrary Euclidean
space Rn,
a ≥ b ⇐⇒ ai ≥ bi ∀ i = 1,...,n,
a > b ⇐⇒ ai ≥ bi ∀ i = 1,...,n with a  = b, and
a ≫ b ⇐⇒ ai > bi ∀ i = 1,...,n.
Throughout the paper, quantities of all intended and unintended outputs, inputs, and cleaning-up output
are assumed to be non-negative. Where obvious, a vector of zeros will be denoted by 0. However, where
the explicit speciﬁcation of dimensionality becomes important, a vector of zeros of dimension c will be
denoted by 0(c).
14 Note the convention: ∅ + Rm
′
+ = ∅.
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Remark 2: Construction of T from T implies that, for all  x,a  ∈ Ω,
Y(x,a) = {y ∈ Rm
+
 
   y,z  ∈ P(x,a) for some z ∈ Rm′
+ } and
Z(x,a) = Z(x,a) + Rm′
+ .
Figures 1 and 2 explain some of the constructs deﬁned above. Both ﬁgures assume
there is only one intended output and one type of emission. Holding the levels of all
inputs and the cleaning-up activity ﬁxed at  x,a , these two ﬁgures provide two diﬀerent
examples of the restrictions P(x,a) of T and P(x,a) of T. Given the vector  x,a , y′ is the
maximum intended output and z′ is the minimum level of emission that can be produced.
There is also an upper bound z′′ on the amount of emission that can be generated given
 x,a . P(x,a) is the bounded area z′ABz′′. On the other hand, the set P(x,a), which
is derived as the costly-disposal hull of the set P(x,a) has an unbounded area. The
boundary of P(x,a) emphasises only the lower bound on emission generation. The set
Y(x,a) is the interval [0,y′]. It is the set of all possible levels of the intended outputs that
can be produced under technology T (and its costly-disposal hull T) by holding inputs
and cleaning-up ﬁxed at  x,a  and by varying the level of the emission. The set Z(x,a) is
the bounded interval [z′,z′′]. It is the set of all possible levels of the emission that can be
produced under technology T , given  x,a , by varying the level of the intended output.
Z(x,a), the set of emission levels permitted by P(x,a), is the unbounded interval [z′,∞).
3. Axiomatization of EGTs.
In this section we provide some axioms which we believe characterize various types
of EGTs. The class of technologies that satisfy these axioms are deﬁned as by-production
technologies. A preliminary implication, Theorem (BP), of these axioms is also derived.
Axioms (C) and (BOUNDy) place some standard restrictions on T . (C) imposes
non-emptiness, convexity, and continuity conditions on T , while (BOUNDy) implies that
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the quantities of intended outputs that can be produced are bounded when inputs are held
ﬁxed and when one allows for some diversion of these ﬁxed inputs for production of a ﬁxed
level of cleaning-up activity.15 Technologies in Figures 1 and 2 satisfy these axioms.
Assumption (C): T is a non-empty, closed, and convex set.
Assumption (BOUNDy): For all  x,a  ∈ Ω, the set Y(x,a) is bounded.
Axiom (FDo) imposes standard free-disposability conditions on those intended out-
puts and inputs that do not cause emissions. Our axiomatization of an EGT also extends
output free disposability to emission-causing intended outputs. This is Axiom (FDyz).
Technologies in Figures 1 and 2 satisfy output free disposability of the intended output.
Assumption (FDo): Free output disposability of non-emission causing intended out-
puts and free input disposability of non-emission causing inputs:
 xz,xo,a,yz,yo,z  ∈ T , ¯ xo ≥ xo, and ¯ yo ≤ yo =⇒  xz, ¯ xo,a,yz, ¯ yo,z  ∈ T .
Assumption (FDyz): Free output disposability of emission-causing intended outputs:
 xz,xo,a,yz,yo,z  ∈ T and ¯ yz ≤ yz =⇒  xz,xo,a, ¯ yz,yo,z  ∈ T .
( ⇐⇒ P(xz,xo,a,yz,yo) ⊆ P(xz,xo,a, ¯ yz,yo) ∀  xz,xo,a,yz,yo  ∈ Ω × Rm
+ and ¯ yz ≤ yz ).
We consider now the case of emission-causing inputs and the cleaning-up activity.
Changes in the levels of these goods aﬀect both intended production and emission genera-
tion simultaneously. In particular, an increase in the levels of the emission-causing inputs
or a decrease in the level of the cleaning-up activity, increases both the lower bound on
emission generation and the upper bound on intended production. The nature of these
15 Technology T could permit emissions to be bounded. We could have made an additional assumption:
for all  x,a  ∈ Ω, the set Z(x,a) is bounded. In this paper, we will however be interested only in the
lower bounds of Z(x,a). So upper-bounds on emissions are often ignored in this paper.
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changes, when technical ineﬃciencies in nature’s emission generating mechanism and in-
tended production are also taken into account, is captured by Axioms (CCDxz,a) and
(CFDxz,a).16
From the point of view of nature’s emission-generating mechanism, standard input
and output free-disposability conditions do not apply in the case of emission-generating
inputs and the cleaning-up activity – in fact, as in Murty [2010a] and MRL polar opposite
conditions, which we call costly disposability of emission-causing inputs and cleaning-up
activity, hold: if  ¯ x,¯ a  produces  ¯ y, ¯ z  then, allowing for technical-ineﬃciencies in nature’s
emission generating mechanism (e.g., ineﬃciencies in burning coal), ¯ z level of emissions
could also be produced by arbitrarily lower levels of emission-causing inputs, say, xz, or
at any higher level of the cleaning-up activity, say, a. Hence, it would seem that the set
of emissions P(¯ xz, ¯ xo,¯ a, ¯ y) is a subset of the set of emissions P(xz, ¯ xo,a, ¯ y). However,
intended production may not allow such a change to be technically feasible: reducing
¯ xz or increasing ¯ a to  xz,a  may mean that too little resources may be available for
intended production, so that ¯ y is no longer feasible for any level of emissions. Hence,
from the point of view of the overall technology, it is possible that P(xz, ¯ xo,a, ¯ y) = ∅.
Thus, Axiom (CCDxz,a), below, is only a conditional costly-disposability assumption on
emission-causing inputs and cleaning-up activity. In Figure 3, it is assumed that there is
a single input, and it causes an emission and produces a non-emission generating intended
output and a cleaning-up activity. Suppose ¯ x level of the input is used. Area A in Panel
2 of this ﬁgure comprises of various combinations of intended outputs and cleaning-up
activity levels that are feasible in intended production given ¯ x. Suppose  ¯ a, ¯ y  is being
produced with ¯ x. Panel 1 shows the nature’s emission-generation technology. In particular,
16 It is convenient to impose these conditions on the costly-disposal hull T rather than directly on T
as these conditions imply some intuitive and empirically observed monotonicity properties of the lower
bounds of emission-generation, e.g., lower bounds on emissions increase (resp., decrease) as the levels of
emission-causing goods (resp., cleaning-up activity) increase.
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holding the cleaning-up activity ﬁxed, the lower bound on emission generation increases
with increase in the input. Panel 1 shows that ¯ x level of input can generate ¯ z level of
the emission. Due to technical ineﬃciencies in emission generation in nature, ¯ z level of
emission can also be generated by a level of input, say x, lower than ¯ x. However, in
intended production, the set of feasible intended output and cleaning-up activity levels
with x level of the input shrinks to area B (in Panel 2) and  ¯ a, ¯ y  is no longer producible
with the reduced level of the input.
Assumption (CCDxz,a): Conditional costly disposability of emission-causing inputs
and cleaning-up activity:
 xz,xo,a,yz,yo,z  ∈ T, ¯ xz ≤ xz, ¯ a ≥ a, and  ¯ xz,¯ a   =  xz,a 
=⇒ either P(¯ xz,xo,¯ a,yz,yo) = ∅ or P(xz,xo,a,yz,yo) ⊂ P(¯ xz,xo,¯ a,yz,yo).
From the point of view of intended production, standard input and output free dis-
posability conditions apply in the case of emission-causing inputs and the cleaning-up
activity: if  x,a  produces  y,z  then, allowing for technical-ineﬃciencies in intended pro-
duction, y level of intended outputs could also be produced by arbitrarily higher levels of
the ﬁrst mz inputs, say, ¯ xz, or at any lower level of the cleaning-up activity, say, ¯ a. Hence,
it would seem that the set of intended outputs P(xz,xo,a,z) is a subset of the set of
intended outputs P(¯ xz,xo,¯ a,z). However, nature’s emission-generating mechanism may
not allow such a change to be technically feasible: increasing xz or decreasing a to  ¯ xz,¯ a 
may mean that emission levels can no longer remain the same, i.e., the levels of emissions
that are produced by the new levels of inputs and abatement may be higher than z for any
level of the intended output. Hence, from the point of view of the overall technology, it
is possible that P(¯ xz,xo,¯ a,z) = ∅. Thus, Axiom (CFDxz,a), below, is only a conditional
free-disposability assumption on emission-causing inputs and cleaning-up activity. In Fig-
ure 4, an increase in the input level from x to ¯ x expands the the production possibility
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set of intended production from A to B, so that the combination  a,y  is still feasible in
intended production with the new input level ¯ x. Nevertheless, in nature, emission level, z,
which corresponds to input level x is below the minimum level of emission, ¯ z, generated
by input level ¯ x.
Assumption (CFDxz,a): Conditional free input disposability of emission-causing in-
puts and conditional free output disposability of cleaning-up activity:
 xz,xo,a,yz,yo,z  ∈ T, ¯ xz ≥ xz, ¯ a ≤ a, and  ¯ xz,¯ a   =  xz,a 
=⇒ either P(¯ xz,xo,¯ a,z) = ∅ or P(xz,xo,a,z) ⊂ P(¯ xz,xo,¯ a,z).
A basic result of by-production, Theorem (BP), follows from some of the axioms
above. It shows that these axioms imply the empirically observed positive correlation
between intended production and emission generation. This correlation is eﬀected through
inputs that cause emissions and the cleaning-up activity. As the levels of emission-causing
inputs increase or the level of the cleaning-up activity decreases, both the set of feasible
levels of intended outputs and the set of feasible levels of emissions shift: in particular ,the
upper bounds on intended outputs and the lower bounds on emissions increase. In Figures
5 and 6 it is assumed that all inputs cause the emission. If the input levels increase from
x to ¯ x or cleaning-up level decreases from a to ¯ a, the maximum (resp. minimum) bound
on the intended output (resp. emission) increases from y′ to ¯ y (resp. from z′ to ¯ z). Thus,
the set Y(x,a) = [0,y′] expands to the set Y(¯ x,¯ a) = [0, ¯ y] and the set Z(x,a) = [z′,∞)
shrinks to the set Z(¯ x,¯ a) = [¯ z,∞).
Theorem (BP): Suppose  x,a  ∈ Ω,  ¯ x,¯ a  ∈ Ω, ¯ x ≥ x, ¯ a ≤ a, and  x,a   =  ¯ x,¯ a .
(i) If Assumption (CFDxz,a) holds then Y(x,a) ⊂ Y(¯ x,¯ a).
(ii) If Assumptions (FDo), (FDyz), and (CCDxz,a) hold then Z(¯ x,¯ a) ⊂ Z(x,a).
15The theory of by-production of emissions and capital-constrained non-cooperative Nash outcomes of a global economy. (S. Murty) July 20, 2011
Axiom (INDo) distinguishes between those intended outputs and inputs that cause
emissions and those that do not. Ceteris-paribus, technologically feasible changes in the
levels of intended outputs or inputs that are non-emission generating have no eﬀect on
the lower bounds of emission generation. On the other hand, ceteris-paribus, when there
are increases in the levels of intended outputs or inputs that are emission-generating, we
expect that the lower-bounds on emission generation will increase. Figure 1 provides an
example of a case where the intended output is non-emission generating, while Figure 2
provides a case where it is emission-generating. In Figure 2, the lower bound on emission
generation increases from z′ (when intended output quantity is 0) to ∗ z (when intended
output quantity increases to y′ > 0) for ﬁxed levels of all inputs and cleaning-up activity.
Assumption (INDo): The last mo intended outputs and the last no inputs do not cause
emissions:
 x,a  ∈ Ω, ¯ xo  = xo, and ¯ yo  = yo =⇒ P(x,a,y) = P(xz, ¯ xo,a,yz, ¯ yo)
if P(x,a,y)  = ∅ and P(xz, ¯ xo,a,yz, ¯ yo)  = ∅.
It is possible that the emissions generated by a ﬁrm when it undertakes intended
production (and triggers oﬀ nature’s emission generating mechanism) can, in turn, aﬀect
(generate external eﬀects on) its production of intended outputs. Axioms (INDz), (DETz),
and (BENz) distinguish between three such cases.
(INDz) captures the case where such external eﬀects are absent: the set of intended
outputs that are feasible under technology T for given levels of inputs, cleaning-up activity,
and emissions is unaﬀected by changes in its emissions.17 The technology in Figure 1
satisﬁes (INDz).
17 Of course, for this set to be non-empty, it must be the case that we are considering conﬁgurations of
inputs, cleaning-up, and emissions that are permitted by nature’s emission-generating mechanism.
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Assumption (INDz): Production of intended outputs is independent of emissions (emis-
sions impose no externalities on intended production):
 x,a  ∈ Ω and ¯ z  = z =⇒ P(x,a,z) = P(x,a, ¯ z) if P(x,a,z)  = ∅ and P(x,a, ¯ z)  = ∅.
(DETz) (resp. (BENz)) captures the case where emissions generated by a ﬁrm impose
detrimental (resp. beneﬁcial) external eﬀects of on its intended production: the set of
intended outputs that are feasible under technology T for given levels of inputs, cleaning-
up activity, and emissions shrinks (resp. expands) as its emissions increase. Technology
in Figure 7 satisﬁes (DETz), while that in Figure 8 satisﬁes (BENz). An example of a
detrimental external eﬀect is one where smoke from a steel mill can aﬀect its own intended
output production by aﬀecting the productivity of its inputs (e.g., labour) in producing
steel. Consider the case where a farmer cultivates leguminous plants such as beans and
peas along with other crops such as cereals as his intended outputs. Leguminous plants
are well-known for attracting nitrogen-ﬁxing bacteria which enrich the soil with nitrogen,
which is an important fertilizer in agriculture. This increases the yield of all crops. Thus,
this is an example of a case where, in nature, an intended output produces an emission
(nitrogen), which imposes a beneﬁcial external eﬀect on intended production.
Assumption (DETz): Emissions impose detrimental externalities on intended produc-
tion:
 x,a  ∈ Ω, ¯ z ≥ z, and ¯ z  = z =⇒ P(x,a, ¯ z) ⊂ P(x,a,z) if P(x,a,z)  = ∅ and P(x,a, ¯ z)  = ∅.
Assumption (BENz): Emissions impose beneﬁcial externalities on intended produc-
tion:
 x,a  ∈ Ω, ¯ z ≥ z, and ¯ z  = z =⇒ P(x,a,z) ⊂ P(x,a, ¯ z) if P(x,a,z)  = ∅ and P(x,a, ¯ z)  = ∅.
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In many instances, there may also be a jointness (simultaneity/complementarity) in
production of multiple emissions by a ﬁrm. For example, a given variety of impure coal
(an input for a thermal electricity producing plant) could have various impurities such as
sulphur and nitrogen, besides its carbon content. So when a ton of such coal is burnt,
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and carbon dioxide are liberated jointly. There is no
relation of substitutability between the three emissions for a given weight of coal burnt.18
Rather, there could be a strong complementarity.19 Allowing for technical ineﬃciencies
in nature’s emission-generating mechanism, axiom (Jz) captures this idea. For all k =
1,...,m′, ceteris-paribus, the set of feasible levels of the kth type of emission, if non-empty,
is not aﬀected by changes in the levels of all other emissions. Figure 9 illustrates this for
the case when m′ = 2. It is assumed that inputs, cleaning-up activity, and intended output
levels are ﬁxed at  x,a,y . The minimum levels of the two types of emissions produced by
nature is given by the vector,  z′
1,z′
2 . There are also upper bounds on emission generation
and these are summarized by the vector,  ∗ z1, ∗ z2 . The sets P(x,a,y) and its costly-disposal
hull P(x,a,y) are indicated.
Assumption (Jz): Jointness in the production of pollutants:
∀  x,a,y  ∈ Ω × Rm
+,
P(xz,xo,a,y,z−k)  = ∅ and P(xz,xo,a,y, ¯ z−k)  = ∅ =⇒
P(xz,xo,a,y,z−k) = P(xz,xo,a,y, ¯ z−k).
For convenience, we deﬁne the set
Z−k(x,a,y) ≡ {z−k ∈ Rm′−1
+
 
  P(x,a,y,z−k)  = ∅}.
For example, in Figure 9, if k = 2 then Z−2(x,a,y) = [z′
1,∞).
18 E.g., it is not the case that if more sulphur dioxide is produced then less carbon dioxide will be
produced, when the amount of coal is held ﬁxed.
19 E.g., these emissions may be produced in ﬁxed proportions.
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Employing the axioms discussed above, we now deﬁne a by-production technology,
i.e., a technology that simultaneously produces both intended and unintended outputs.
Essentially, it is a technology that satisﬁes the conclusions of Theorem (BP) and, hence,
reﬂects the positive correlation between intended production and emission generation.
Deﬁnition: T is a by-production technology (BPT) if Assumptions (C), (BOUNDy),
(FDo), (FDyz), (CCDxz,a), (CFDxz,a), and (INDo) hold.
Technologies in Figures 1, 2, 7, and 8 are all BPTs. We also distinguish between
diﬀerent types of BPTs depending on whether emissions do or do not impose external
eﬀects on intended production:
Deﬁnition: T is a strong by-production technology (SBPT) if it is a BPT with Assumption
(INDz) holding.
Deﬁnition: T is a by-production with detrimental externalities technology (DETBPT) if
it is a BPT with Assumption (DETz) holding.
Deﬁnition: T is a by-production with beneﬁcial externalities technology (BENBPT) if it
is a BPT with Assumption (BENz) holding.
Thus, assuming there is only a single emission type and a single intended output,
Figure 1 is an example of a SBPT, Figure 7 is a case of a DETBPT, while Figure 8 is a
case of a BENBPT. Suppose, a plot of empirically observed data from an EGT leads to
Figure 2. Two possible explanations are possible: (i) Figure 2 reﬂects a BENBPT and
(ii) Figure 2 reﬂects a technology where, in nature, the intended output is also a cause
of emission generation.20 Hence, based only on the empirically observed data, we may
20 Strictly speaking, our particular deﬁnition of a BENBPT will not classify Figure 2 as being derived
from a BENBPT. Nevertheless, it can be argued that our condition for deﬁning a beneﬁcial externality
on intended production can be weakened to accommodate Figure 2 as a case of a BENBPT.
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not always be able to distinguish between technologies where emissions impose beneﬁcial
external eﬀects on intended outputs and technologies where emissions are also caused by
intended outputs. Prior engineering and scientiﬁc knowledge is required to make such
distinctions.
4. Distance-function representations of EGTs.
Based on the various axioms discussed above, which we strongly believe character-
ize EGTs, we now present a functional representation of such technologies based on the
concept of a distance function.
Since an EGT reﬂects both intended production by ﬁrms and the nature’s emission-
generating mechanism, two distance functions D1 and D2 are deﬁned.
D1 primarily captures the (upper) bounds set by intended production on intended
outputs and hence will be deﬁned relative to T and its restrictions P( ). Deﬁne the
mapping
D1 : Ω × Rm+m′
+  −→ R+ ∪ {∞} (4.1)
with image
D1(x,a,yz,yo,z) ≡ inf {λ1 > 0






  ∈ P(x,a)}.
D2 primarily captures the (lower) bounds set by nature on emission generation and
hence will be deﬁned relative to the costly-disposal hull T and its restrictions P( ). Deﬁne
the mapping
D2 : Ω × Rm+m′
+  −→ R+ ∪ {∞} (4.2)
with image
D2(x,a,yz,yo,z) := inf {λ2 ≥ 0
 
   λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a)}.
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For all  x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω×Rm+m′
+ , deﬁne the constraint sets of the optimization problems
(4.1) and (4.2):
Λ1(x,a,y,z) :={λ1 > 0
 






  ∈ P(x,a)} and
Λ2(x,a,y,z) :={λ2 > 0
 
   λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a)}.
4.1. Properties of mapping D1.
For any production vector  x,a,y,z  (technologically feasible or infeasible), D1 asks
the question, what is the minimum amount by which we need to radially scale down
the output vector  y,z  to make the resulting vector producible under technology T
with input level x and cleaning-up level a.21 Thus,  
y
D1(x,a,y,z), z
D1(x,a,y,z)  is in the set
P(x,a). In Figure 11, this scaling process takes points such as  z,y ,  z′,y′ , and  ¯ z, ¯ y  to
 ∗ z, ∗ y  ∈ P(x,a). Thus, the minimal scaling-down factors are D1(x,a,y,z) =
  z,y  
  ∗ z,∗ y   < 1,
D1(x,a,y′,z′) =
  z′,y′  
  ∗ z,∗ y   < 1, and D1(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) =
  ¯ z,¯ y  
  ∗ z,∗ a   > 1, resp.22 In each of these
cases, the constraint set of optimization (4.1) is non-empty (e.g., Λ1(x,a,y,z) is the set
of scaling factors which move  z,y  along the ray r), and D1 is unique and well deﬁned
(real valued). However, the constraint set of problem (4.1) can be empty; e.g., take point
 ˜ z, ˜ y . No amount of scaling of this vector can make it feasible under T with  x,a .
Λ1(x,a, ˜ y, ˜ z) = ∅ and by deﬁnition of D1 in (4.1), D1(x,a, ˜ y, ˜ z) = ∞. Note that, wherever
D1 is well deﬁned, the operation (4.1), takes us to points which are on the (weak) upper-
frontier, the curve ABC, of P(x,a). The points on the upper frontier are reﬂective of the
upper bounds on intended production or on emission generation.
Theorem (IP) brings out the properties of the mapping D1 deﬁned with respect to a
BPT.
21 Equivalently, D1(x,a,y,z) is the inverse of the maximum amount by which  y,z  can be radially
scaled up so that the resulting vector lies in the set P(x,a).
22    z,y    is the Euclidean length of the vector  z,y .
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Theorem (IP): Suppose Assumptions (C), (BOUNDy), (FDo), (CFDxz,a), (CCDxz,a),
and (FDyz) hold.
(i) For all  x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω × Rm+m′
+ , D1(x,a,y,z) is well deﬁned (ﬁnite) and unique if
and only if Λ1(x,a,y,z)  = ∅.
(ii)  x,a,y,z  ∈ T ⇒ D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1.
(iii) In the domain where D1 is well deﬁned:
• it is homogeneous of degree one and convex, in y and z;
• it is non-decreasing in y;
• it is non-increasing in x and non-decreasing in a;
• it is constant in z if (INDz) holds;
• it is non-decreasing in z if (DETz) holds; and
• it is non-increasing in z if (BENz) holds.
(iv) D1 is continuous in its arguments.
4.2. Properties of mapping D2.
For any production vector  x,a,y,z  (technologically feasible or infeasible), D2 asks
the question, what is the minimum amount by which we need to radially scale up the output
vector  y,z  to make it feasible to produce under the costly-disposal hull T of technology T
with input level x and cleaning-up level a.23 Thus,  D2(x,a,y,z) y,D2(x,a,y,z) z  is in the
set P(x,a). In Figure 12, this scaling process takes points such as  z,y ,  z′,y′ , and  ¯ z, ¯ y 
to  ˆ z, ˆ y  ∈ P(x,a). Thus, the minimal scaling-up factors are D2(x,a,y,z) =
  ˆ z,ˆ y  
  z,y   < 1,
D2(x,a,y′,z′) =
  ˆ z,ˆ y  
  z′,y′   > 1, and D2(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) =
  ˆ z,ˆ y  
  ¯ z,¯ y   < 1, resp. In each of these cases,
the constraint set of optimization (4.2) is non-empty (e.g., Λ2(x,a,y,z) is the set of scaling
factor which move  z,y  along the ray r), and D2 is unique and well deﬁned (real valued).
23 Equivalently, D2(x,a,y,z) is the inverse of the maximum amount by which we need to radially scale
down  y,z  so that the resulting vector lies in the set P(x,a).
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However, the constraint set of problem (4.2) can be empty; as e.g., Λ2(x,a, ˜ y, ˜ z) = ∅ and
by deﬁnition of D2 in (4.2), D2(x,a, ˜ y, ˜ z) = ∞. Note that, wherever D2 is well deﬁned, the
operation (4.2), takes us to points which are on the (weak) lower-frontier AD of P(x,a).
The points on the lower frontier are reﬂective of the lower bounds on emission generation
imposed by nature.
Theorem (EG) brings out the properties of the mapping D2 for BPT. Primarily, D2
characterises the lower bounds on nature’s emission-generating mechanism.
Theorem (EG): Suppose Assumptions (C), (FDo), (FDyz), (CCDxz,a), and (INDo)
hold.
(i) For all  x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω×Rm+1
+ , D2(x,a,y,z) is well deﬁned (ﬁnite) and unique if and
only if Λ2(x,a,y,z)  = ∅.
(ii)  x,a,y,z  ∈ T ⇒ D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1.
(iii) In the domain where D2 is well deﬁned:
• it is homogeneous of degree one and convex in y and z;
• it is non-increasing in z and non-decreasing in yz;
• it is non-decreasing in x and non-increasing in a; and
• it is constant in yo and xo.
(iv) D2 is continuous in its arguments.
4.3. A representation theorem for a BPT and its eﬃcient frontier.
Theorem (BP-REPR), below, shows that, provided a technical condition that we call
Assumption (∗) holds, a BPT can be represented functionally by employing the distance
functions D1 and D2.
Assumption (∗): For all  x,a  ∈ Ω,
z ∈ Z(x,a) and z  ∈ Z(x,a) =⇒ κz  ∈ Z(x,a) ∀ κ ≥ 1.
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For a BPT, Assumption (∗) is a condition on the upper-bounds of emission generation.
It is satisﬁed, e.g., for the technology in Figure 10, where it is assumed that there are two
types of emissions and axiom (Jz) holds. Similarly, it can be seen that it is also satisﬁed
for technologies in Figures 1, 2, 7, and 8, where we assume that there is only one type of
emission and Z(x,a) is bounded for all  x,a  ∈ Ω.
Theorem (BP-REPR): Suppose T is a BPT and Assumption (∗) holds. Then
 x,a,y,z  ∈ T ⇐⇒ D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1 and D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1.
The necessity part of the above representation theorem is clear from the deﬁnitions
of D1 and D2 in (4.1) and (4.2): if  x,a,y,z  ∈ T , then clearly 1 ∈ Λ1(x,a,y,z) and
1 ∈ Λ2(x,a,y,z), so that D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1 and D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1.
Suﬃciency can be intuitively explained by employing Figures 11 and 12 to illustrate
the contrapositive: for a production vector that is not feasible under a given BPT T , at
least one of the distance functions D1 or D2 takes a value (strictly) bigger than 1. Three
cases are possible:
(1) The point could be such as  ¯ z, ¯ y  / ∈ P(x,a) for which D2(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) =
  ˆ z,ˆ y 
  ¯ z,¯ y  ≤ 1. In
that case, D1(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) =
  ¯ z,¯ y 
  ∗ z,∗ y  > 1.
(2) The point could be such as  z′,y′  / ∈ P(x,a) for which D1(x,a,y′,z′) =
  z′,y′ 
  ∗ z,∗ y  ≤ 1.
In that case, D2(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) =
  ˆ z,ˆ y 
  z′,y′  > 1.
(3) The point could be such as  ˜ z, ˜ y  / ∈ P(x,a) for which D1(x,a, ˜ y, ˜ z) = D2(x,a, ˜ y, ˜ z) =
∞ > 1.
Theorem (BP-EFFICIENCY), below, provides a characterization of the eﬃcient fron-
tier of a BPT. We ﬁrst deﬁne the notion of eﬃciency.24
24 This deﬁnition of eﬃciency is normatively acceptable for the case of detrimental emissions. It will
need to be modiﬁed for the case of beneﬁcial emissions, where eﬃciency would require there exists no
other point  ¯ x,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z  ∈ T such that  x,a,y,z   =  ¯ x,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z , ¯ x ≤ x, ¯ a ≥ a, ¯ y ≥ y, and ¯ z ≥ z.
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Deﬁnition: Suppose T is a BPT.  x,a,y,z  is a strictly eﬃcient point of T if  x,a,y,z  ∈
T and there exists no other point  ¯ x,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z  ∈ T such that  x,a,y,z   =  ¯ x,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z , ¯ x ≤ x,
¯ a ≥ a, ¯ y ≥ y, and ¯ z ≤ z. The strictly eﬃcient frontier of T , denoted by Front(T ), is the
set of strictly eﬃcient points of T .
In each of Figures 1 and 7, there is only one strictly eﬃcient point in P(x,a), namely,
the point A. It can be veriﬁed that at such points both D1 and D2 take value equal to
1. Theorem (BP-EFFICIENCY) shows that this is true generally for the cases of SBPTs
and DETBPTs when no intended output is emission-generating. In each of Figures 2 and
8, (which are the cases where the intended output is emission generating or where the
technology is BENBPT), the set of strictly eﬃcient points in P(x,a) is the line-segment
Az′. At all such points, it can be veriﬁed that D2 takes value equal to 1. However, this is
not true of D1.
Theorem (BP-EFFICIENCY): Suppose T is a SBPT or a DETBPT, mz = 0, As-
sumption (∗) holds, and D1 and D2 are deﬁned as in (4.1) and (4.2), resp. Then:
 x,a,y,z  is a strictly eﬃcient point of T ⇐⇒ D1(x,a,y,z) = 1 and D2(x,a,y,z) = 1.
4.4. Decomposition of a BPT into intended-production and nature’s emission-generation
sets.
Suppose we observe empirically a BPT T . The observed feasible production points
must be simultaneously feasible with respect to the underlying intended production tech-
nology and nature’s emission-generation set. Can we, employing this data, independently
recover these two sets? Theorem (BP-DECOMP) shows that by applying programmes
(4.1) and (4.2) we can decompose T into its underlying intended production technology
T1 and the costly-disposal hull of the nature’s emission-generation set T2. If, in addition,
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Assumption (Jz) is true and no intended output is emission generating in nature, then we
can also obtain distinct emission-generating sets of nature for diﬀerent emission types by
deﬁning new distance functions.
Theorem (BP-DECOMP): Suppose T is a BPT, Assumption (∗) holds, and D1 and
D2 are deﬁned as in (4.1) and (4.2), resp. Deﬁne the intended production technology
T1 := { x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω × Rm+m′
+
 
  D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1}
and the costly disposal-hull of nature’s emission-generation set
T2 := { x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω × Rm+m′
+
    D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1}.
Then T = T1 ∩ T2.
Suppose, in addition, mz = 0 and (Jz) is true. For all k = 1,...,m′, deﬁne the mappings
D2k : Ω × Rm+m′
+  −→ R+ ∪ {∞}
with image
D2k(x,a,y,zk,z−k) = inf{λ2k > 0
    λ2kzk ∈ P(x,a,y,z−k)}. (4.3)
Then, in the domain where it is well deﬁned, each D2k is a real-valued function, which is
constant in z−k and y. For all k = 1,...,m′, deﬁne the costly-disposal hulls of nature’s
separate emission-generation sets
T2k := { x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω × Rm+m′
+








1). D22 can be deﬁned as in (4.3). Wherever well deﬁned, it is













. Similarly, we can also










. D21 is constant in z2, wherever it is well deﬁned.
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5. Constructing BPTs.
In the above discussion, we began with a (possibly, empirically observed) BPT and
then derived it’s functional representation by employing programmes (4.1) and (4.2). Al-
ternatively, we can construct a BPT by beginning with two real-valued continuous func-
tions D1 and D2 deﬁned on the domain Rn+m+m′+1
+ with properties listed in parts (iii) of
Theorems (IP) and (EG), resp., and use them to construct a BPT set, say T .25
Theorem (BP-CONSTRUCT): Suppose the mappings
D1 : Rn+m+m′+1
+  −→ R+
with image λ1 = D1(x,a,yz,yo,z) and
D2 : Rn+m+m′+1
+  −→ R+
with image λ2 = D2(x,a,yz,yo,z) are two continuous functions such that
(1) D1 is homogeneous of degree one and convex in y and z, non-decreasing in y, non-
increasing in x, and non-decreasing in a and
(2) D2 is homogeneous of degree one and convex in y and z, non-increasing in zk, non-
decreasing in yz, non-decreasing in x, non-increasing in a, and constant in yo and
xo.
Deﬁne the sets
T1 := { x,a,y,z  ∈ Rn+m+m′+1
+
    D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1},
T2 := { x,a,y,z  ∈ Rn+m+m′+1
+
 
  D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1}, and
T = T1 ∩ T2.
T is a
(i) SBPT if D1 is constant in z.
25 T so derived may not have upper bounds on emissions. However, if we had also focussed on the
upper bounds on nature’s emission generation and had discussed a third class of distance functions which
capture these upper-bounds, then T would also have been bounded in z.
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(ii) DETBPT if D1 is non-decreasing in z.
(i) BENBPT if D1 is non-increasing in z.
Example 1.
In the following example, we construct a BPT T by applying Theorem (BP-CONSTRUCT).
Consider the case where a ﬁrm employs wood, water, chemicals, labor, and capital as inputs
to produce paper. Two types of residuals are jointly produced as by-products. Suppose
the ﬁrm also has an eﬄuent treatment plant. Thus, the quantity vectors are z =  z1,z2 ,
xz =  xz1,xz2 , and xo =  xo1,xo2,xo3 , where the ﬁrst and second emission-causing inputs






















α21xz1 + α22xz2 − θa
z2
, and
α11 > 0, α12 > 0, α21 > 0, α22 > 0, θ > 0.
Deﬁne:
T1 := { x,a,y,z  ∈ R9
+

















T21 := { x,a,y,z  ∈ R9
+
 
  z1 ≥ α11xz1 + α12xz2 − θa},
T22 := { x,a,y,z  ∈ R9
+
 
  z2 ≥ α21xz1 + α22xz2 − θa}, and
T = T1 ∩ T2, where T2 = T21 ∩ T22.
It can be veriﬁed that T , which could be a potential technology of the ﬁrm, is a SBPT
that satisﬁes (Jz). Further, mz = 0. T1 and T2 are the underlying intended production
technology and the (costly-disposal hull of) nature’s emission generation technology, resp.
28The theory of by-production of emissions and capital-constrained non-cooperative Nash outcomes of a global economy. (S. Murty) July 20, 2011
From Theorem (BP-EFFICIENCY) it follows that
Front(T ) ≡
 
 x,a,y,z  ∈ R8
+
 

















(ii) z1 = α11xz1 + α12xz2 − θa, and




Note, there are several abatement strategies available to a ﬁrm, such as decreasing the use
of the emission causing inputs, wood or paper, or increasing the level of the cleaning-up
activity, or some combinations of these. Diﬀerent abatement strategies generate diﬀer-
ent trade-oﬀs (correlations) between intended production and emission generation along
Front(T ), which can be computed using the implicit function theorem, e.g.,
• Consider changing the level of the emission-causing chemical input to ¯ xz2 holding
the levels all other inputs and the cleaning-up activity ﬁxed. Employing the implicit




















• Ceteris paribus, if the level of the emission-causing wood input is changed, then the




















• Ceteris paribus, if the level of cleaning-up activity is changed, then the trade-oﬀ







26 Which amounts to substituting for xz2 from (ii) of (5.1) into (i) of (5.1).
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6. Application of by-production modeling of emission-generating technologies
to international non-cooperative emission outcomes.
In this section, the distance function representation of a BPT obtained in the previous
sections is employed to help study and explain cross-country diﬀerences in emission levels at
a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of a global economy. Richness or poorness of a country
is attributed solely to diﬀerences in the initial endowments of a particular resource, which
we call capital. The aim is to study to what extent the sheer diﬀerences in the availability
of a key productive factor can help explain cross-country diﬀerences in emissions. All
countries, rich or poor, are assumed to have the same preferences for a clean environment
(or dirty emissions) and consumption of an intended output. In particular, emission is
assumed to be an inferior good. Each country is free to choose what to produce (subject
only to its capital constraint) from a set of technological choices, which is also assumed to
be common to all countries.
6.1. Speciﬁcation of the global economy.
(G1) to (G7) are the speciﬁcations of the global economy we will study. We would like
to model all standard aspects of production theory: in particular, the economic law of
diminishing return. The BP approach allows us to do so in a most general way. However,
a very general speciﬁcation of a BPT can make the analysis quite intractable. Hence, the
structure of the technology described below is kept reasonably simple. Yet, it encompasses
a rich set of production features which are realistic, quite intuitive, and pertinent to the
question at hand.
(G1) S countries indexed by s.
(G2) Every country employs inputs capital, labour, and nz varieties of fuels27 with
varying emission intensities28 to produce a non-emission causing intended output and a
27 e.g., coal, oil, etc..
28 Emissions per unit of fuel burnt.
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cleaning-up activity. Hence, m = 1, m′ = 1, n = no + nz, no = 2, mz = 0. For notational
convenience, let k denote the quantity of capital input, l the quantity of labor input, and
xz =  xz1,...,xznz  the quantity vector of various varieties of fuels used in the production
of the intended output. Thus, x =  xz,xo  with xo =  l,k .
(G3) It is also possible that, in addition to contributing directly to intended produc-
tion, fuel inputs may also be required to run capital equipment; i.e., there is also a strong
complementarity between the use of the fuel inputs and capital, e.g., coal and other fuels
may be needed directly to produce thermal electricity. In addition it, along with other
fuel inputs such as oil, may also be needed to provide power for running the capital equip-
ment in a thermal power plant. For simplicity, let us assume that the use of capital input
requires only the ﬁrst type of fuel. Deﬁne a smooth function φ : R+ −→ R+ with image
φ(k) as the amount of the ﬁrst type of fuel needed to run k units of capital equipment.
We will consider two extreme cases: one where the use of capital is not fuel intensive and
the other where it is. Thus, function φ is such that either φ(k) = 0 ∀ k or φk(k) > 0 ∀ k.
(G4) All countries have identical technologies represented by smooth distance func-
tions D1 : R4+nz
+ −→ R+ and D2 : R4+nz







i=1 αixzi + α1φ(k) − θa
z
.
f is a smooth function, which is concave in xz and l with
fxzi > 0, fl > 0, fk > 0,
fxzixzi ≤ 0, fxzˆ ıxzi = 0, fll = 0, flk = 0, flxzi = 0, fxzik = 0, i,ˆ ı = 1,...,nz, i  = ˆ ı,
h is a smooth and quasi-convex function with ha > 0, hy = 1, hya = 0, haa ≥ 0, and
αi > 0, θ > 0.
29 Note that capital itself is a non-emission causing input in nature. It is associated with emission only to
the extent the fuel input, φ( ), needed for running it triggers-oﬀ the nature’s emission-causing mechanism.
Hence, the fuel input, φ( ), is a part of the nature’s emission-causing mechanism.
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For all i = 1,...,nz, αi denotes the emission intensity of ith variety of coal. Let θ denote
the cleaning-up intensity of the cleaning-up activity.30 The universally available technology
is denoted by T :31
T =
 
 xz,l,k,a,y,z  ∈ R5+nz
+
 




 xz,l,k,a,y,z  ∈ R5+nz
+
    h(a,y) ≤ f(xz,l,k), z ≥
nz  
i=1




(G5) For every variety of fuel, there is a constant marginal (labour) cost of extraction
(production), which is common for all countries: For all i = 1,...,nz, the labour extraction
cost of one unit of the ith variety of fuel for any country is ci > 0. If xz is the amount of
fuel used directly in the production of the intended outputs, the use of capital input is fuel
intensive, and k is the amount of capital input used, then the total labour cost of extraction
is given by the function ϕ : R2+nz
+ −→ R+ with image ϕ(xz,l,k) ≡ l+
 nz
i=1 cixzi+c1φ(k).
(G6) All countries have the same initial endowment, ¯ L, of labour input. Countries
diﬀer with respect to the endowment of capital. There is autarky. Capital and labour are
ﬁxed inputs. Diﬀerences in technological relations across countries arise only because of
the diﬀerences in their capital endowments. Capital endowment of country s is ks. Thus,
technology of country s is
T s =
 
 xz,l,k,a,y,z  ∈ R5+nz
+
 
   xz,l,k,a,y,z  ∈ T , k = ks, and l ≤ ¯ L
 
. (6.2)
(G7) Welfare of a country depends on its consumption of the intended output, its own
emission, and global emissions. All countries have identical preferences. Global emissions
are the sum of emissions by all countries. For every country s = 1,...,S, assuming ˜ g
30 Cleaning-up intensity is the reduction in emissions per unit of cleaning-up activity.
31 Since the upper bounds on emission generation have not been speciﬁed, note that the costly-disposal
hull of T is also T . Hence, restriction mappings P( ) of T and P( ) of the costly-disposal hull of T are
equal.
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denotes the amount of emissions of all but the sth country, preferences are represented by
a smooth and strictly quasi-concave utility function u : R3
+ −→ R+ with image
u = u(y,z, ˜ g + z)
uy > 0, uz < 0, u˜ g < 0, uyz = 0, uy˜ g = 0, u˜ gz = 0, u˜ g˜ g = 0.
(6.3)
The form of u suggests that emission of a country has both local and global eﬀects. In
particular, the latter has only a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the welfare of a country, while the
former can have both ﬁrst and second order welfare eﬀects. Emissions cause disutility to
a country.
Remark 3: Under speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7) of the global economy, D1 (resp., D2)
satisﬁes all properties in (1) (resp., (2)) of Theorem (BP-CONSTRUCT). Hence, for all
s = 1,...,S, T s is a BPT.
6.2. The optimization problem of an economy and a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
emission outcome.




) if φ is smooth and increasing in k and
= ∞ if φ(k) = 0 for all k.
If the use of capital requires fuel then there is an upper bound on the capital stock that a
country can use, since the maximum amount of labour that can be put to fuel extraction
purposes is bounded by ¯ L. This upper bound is ρ. So in our analysis, k ∈ (0,ρ). Deﬁne
the function U : R++ × (0,ρ) −→ R+ with image
U(˜ g,k) ≡ max
xz>0, l>0, a>0, y>0, z>0
u(y,z, ˜ g + z)
subject to
D1(xz,l,k,a,y) ≤ 1, D2(xz,l,k,a,z) ≤ 1, and ϕ(xz,l,k) ≤ ¯ L.
(6.4)
Every country with a particular initial endowment k of capital and facing emissions ˜ g from
all other countries solves problem (6.4). Let the solution mapping to (6.4) be denoted by
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Φ : R++ × (0,ρ) −→ R4+nz
++ with image  xz,l,a,y,z  ∈ Φ(˜ g,k). If the mapping Φ is
a function, then Φ(˜ g,k) ≡
 
ˆ xz(˜ g,k), ˆ l(˜ g,k), ˆ a(˜ g,k), ˆ y(˜ g,k), ˆ z(˜ g,k)
 
. The following
theorem shows that Φ is well-deﬁned. In particular, every conﬁguration  ˜ g,k  ∈ R++ ×
(0,ρ) results in a unique choice of intended-output and emission levels.
Theorem (SOLUTION-OPT): Under speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7) of the global econ-
omy, the solution mapping Φ of (6.4) is well-deﬁned and upper-hemicontinuous. In par-
ticular, the components y and z of Φ are continuous functions ˆ y and ˆ z.
Deﬁne the function ˜ gs : RS−1






Deﬁnition:  ∗ z1,..., ∗ zS  is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium emission outcome of the
global economy with speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7) if, for all s = 1,...,S, we have
∗ zs = ˆ z
 
˜ gs(∗ z(−s)), ks
 
.
Remark 4: There exists a unique non-cooperative Nash equilibrium emission outcome of
the global economy with speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7).33
The following theorem examines the relation between the levels of capital endowment
and emission at a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. It shows that this relation crucially
depends on the monotonicity property of function ˆ z in k. As we move from capital-poor
to capital-rich countries, emissions decrease or increase depending on whether ˆ z is non-
increasing or non-decreasing in k. On the other hand, if ˆ z has a global maximum at
∗
k
level of capital, then we obtain an inverted U shape curve of emissions–a manifestation of
the environmental Kuznets curve phenomenon.
32 For any s = 1,...,S, the vector z(−s) denotes a (S − 1)-dimensional quantity vector of emissions
generated by all countries other than the sth country.
33 Proof is standard.
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Theorem (NON-COOP-NASH k,z RELATION): Let  ∗ z1,..., ∗ zS  be a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium emission outcome of the global economy with speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7).
Suppose k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kS.
(i) If the function ˆ z is non-increasing (resp., non-decreasing) in k and constant in ˜ g then
∗ z1 ≥ ∗ z2 ≥ ... ≥ ∗ zS (resp., ∗ z1 ≤ ∗ z2 ≤ ... ≤ ∗ zS).
(ii) If the function ˆ z is constant in ˜ g and there exists
∗
k ≥ 0 such that the function ˆ z
has a maximum at
∗











6.3. A comparative static exercise.
Theorem (NON-COOP-NASH k,z RELATION) implies that the knowledge of the
monotonicity property of function ˆ z in k is important for understanding the cross-country
diﬀerences in emission levels at a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. This calls for a
comparative static analysis of problem (6.4), which is the agenda of the current section.
The Lagrangian of (6.4) is
L = u(y,z, ˜ g + z) − λ[h(y,a) − f(xz,l,k)] − δ[
nz  
i=1




cixzi + c1φ(k) − ¯ L].
(6.6)
The ﬁrst-order conditions of (6.4) for an interior optimum are
uy − λ = 0, (6.7)
uz + δ = 0, (6.8)
−λha + δθ = 0, (6.9)
λfl − γ = 0, (6.10)
λfxzi − δαi − γci = 0, ∀ i = 1,...,nz, (6.11)
35The theory of by-production of emissions and capital-constrained non-cooperative Nash outcomes of a global economy. (S. Murty) July 20, 2011








cixzi + c1φ(k) − ¯ L] = 0. (6.14)



















, ∀ i = 1,...,nz. (6.16)
The left-side of (6.16) is the trade-oﬀ between intended production and emission gener-
ation, obtained as a result of increasing the usage of the ith fuel: the numerator is the
net increase in intended production,35 while the denominator is the increase in the level
of emission. The right-side of (6.16) is the trade-oﬀ between intended production and
emission generation due to a decrease in the level of the cleaning-up activity: the numer-
ator is the increase in intended production, while the denominator is the increase in the
level of emission. At a solution to (6.4), for a given level of capital, (6.16) shows that the
trade-oﬀs between intended production and emission generation obtained by any abate-
ment strategy (e.g., decrease in the level of any fuel input or an increase in the level of
cleaning-up activity) are equalized. (6.16), thus, describes the trade-oﬀ in production at a
solution to (6.4). (6.15) shows that the trade-oﬀs between intended-output and emission
in consumption and production are also equalized at a solution to (6.4). The trade-oﬀ
between intended-output and emission in consumption is the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between consumption of the intended output and emission.
34 Recall, hy = 1.
35 It is net of the loss due to diverting labour from intended production to extraction of the additional
amount of the fuel.
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Standard comparative static analysis of problem (6.4) yields the following Lemma.
The Lemma yields general results, but we will be more interested in employing this lemma
to study some interesting special cases later.
Lemma (COMP-STATICSk, ˜ g): Under speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7) of the global econ-
omy, if the solution mapping Φ of (6.4) is a diﬀerentiable function, haa > 0, and fxzixzi < 0









































































































= 0, ∀ i = 1,...,nz. (6.22)







∂k for all i = 1,...,nz, i.e., as capital changes, the changes in the opti-
mal36 intended output-emission trade-oﬀs should continue to be equal across all abatement
strategies. Given the sign conventions we have adopted (which are indicative of the phe-
nomenon of diminishing returns), this implies that for all i = 1,...,nz,
∂ˆ xzi
∂k and ∂ˆ a
∂k will
have opposite signs.
36 With respect to problem (6.4).
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6.4. The income and substitution eﬀects of a change in capital endowments on an econ-
omy’s emission when emission is an inferior good.
In this section we will decompose the changes in solution values of intended output
and emission due to a change in capital into substitution and income eﬀects. The sub-
stitution eﬀects arise because the optimal MRS or the trade-oﬀ between intended output
and emission could change as capital level changes. The change in the MRS is attributed
to the phenomenon of diminishing returns to various abatement strategies, while the signs
of the income eﬀects are governed by our assumptions that emission is an inferior good
and the intended output is a normal good in consumption.
Normalizing the price of the intended output to 1, deﬁne a vector of Marshallian
demands for emission and the intended output arising out of a hypothetical utility maxi-
mization exercise for any country facing ˜ g amount of emissions from all other countries:37
d(p,m) =  z(p,m),y(p,m)  ≡ argmaxy,z{u(y,z, ˜ g + z)
 
  y + pz ≤ m}. (6.23)





  u(y,z, ˜ g + z) ≥ u}, (6.24)
yielding the Hicksian demands: dH(p,u) =  zH(p,u),yH(p,u) .
Assumption (INFERIORz): Emission is an inferior good: A ≡ uyuyz − uzuyy < 0.
Assumption (NORMALy): Intended output is a normal good: B ≡ uyuzz−uzuyz < 0.
Remark 5 follows from standard comparative static exercises based on utility maxi-
mization and expenditure minimization:
Remark 5:
37 The relative price p is negative since emission is a bad good. m is the hypothetical income of the
country.
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• The optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of the utility maximization, denoted by
µ, is uy.38







= −[uyB − uzA] > 0.










































• If E(p,u) = m, then ∂E
∂p = zH(p,u) = z(p,m).40
Lemma (SHADOWp,m) shows that for any  ˜ g,k  ∈ R++ × (0,ρ), there exist a pair
of shadow price and income such that ˆ y(˜ g,k) and ˆ z(˜ g,k) solve the utility maximization
problem (6.23). The existence of such shadow price and income follows from the ﬁrst order
condition (6.15) of problem (6.4).
Lemma (SHADOWp,m): Suppose the global economy satisﬁes speciﬁcations (G1) to
(G7) and the solution mapping Φ of (6.4) is a diﬀerentiable function. For any  ˜ g,k  ∈














, ∀i = 1,...,nz, and
m(˜ g,k) = p(˜ g,k)ˆ z(˜ g,k) + ˆ y(˜ g,k),
(6.25)
38 The optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of expenditure minimization is the inverse of the optimal
value of the Lagrange multiplier of utility maximization.
39 See Figures 14 and 15.
40 This follows from Shephard’s lemma and the duality between expenditure minimization and utility
maximization.
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where uz, uy, ha, and fz are evaluated at the optimal quantity vector Φ(˜ g,k). Then
d(p(˜ g,k),m(˜ g,k)) ≡   y(p(˜ g,k),m(˜ g,k)), z(p(˜ g,k),m(˜ g,k))  










































z + fk − φkfxz1. (6.28)
Note that the change in the shadow price due to change in capital in (6.27) reﬂects
the change in the MRS between consumption of intended output and emission, which in
turn is equal to the change in the trade-oﬀ between intended production and emission















































































Given  ˜ g,k  ∈ R++ × (0,ρ) and for ˆ t = ˆ z(˜ g,k), ˆ y(˜ g,k),41 deﬁne the substitution eﬀect
of a change in the level of the capital input as the income compensated change in demand
due to a change in prices brought about by a change in capital:






and deﬁne the income eﬀect of a change in the level of the capital input as the change in
demand brought about by the change in real income brought about by a change in the
capital input:












41 Or, equivalently, for t = z(p(˜ g,k),m(˜ g,k)), y(p(˜ g,k),m(˜ g,k)).
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= SEˆ t(˜ g,k) + IEˆ t(˜ g,k). (6.32)
The following theorem, which quantiﬁes the income and substitution eﬀects of a change
in the level of capital, follows immediately from Remark 5 and Lemma (SHADOWp,m).
If haa = 0 or fxzixzi = 0 for all i = 1,...,nz, i.e., there are no diminishing returns to fuel
inputs or the cleaning-up activity, then (6.27) implies there is no change in the shadow
price (negative of the MRS) as capital changes. Hence, substitution eﬀects are zero.
Theorem (INC&SUBST-EFFECTSz,y): Suppose the global economy satisﬁes spec-
iﬁcations (G1) to (G7), and the solution mapping Φ of (6.4) is a diﬀerentiable function.
Then,






























If fxzxz = 0 or haa = 0, then SEˆ z(˜ g,k) = 0 and SEˆ y(˜ g,k) = 0.
6.5. Some special cases of the global economy satisfying (G1) to (G7).
We now consider some special cases of our model of the global economy. The ﬁrst two
special cases shed more light in understanding the cross-country diﬀerences in emission
levels at a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The third special case considers the role of
inter-fuel substitution in emission generation.
6.5.1. The case of zero fuel intensity of the capital input.
Consider a simple case where there is only one emission-generating input and there
is no fuel cost of running capital.42 The following theorem is a direct application of
Lemma (COMP-STATICSk, ˜ g), Remark 5, and Theorems (INC&SUBST-EFFECTSz,y)
and (NON-COOP-NASH k,z RELATION).
42 In all the special cases which involve only one emission-causing input, we suppress the subscript i.
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Theorem (NO-FUEL-COSTk): Suppose speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7) of the global
economy hold. If nz = 1, φ(k) = 0 for all k, the solution mapping Φ of (6.4) is a diﬀer-
entiable function, haa > 0, fxzixzi < 0 for i = 1,...,nz, and Assumptions (INFERIORz)









yfxzxz − (haaα2 − fxzxzθ2)















































yfxzxz − (haaα2 − fxzxzθ2)
  > 0 and,
(v) SEˆ z(˜ g,k) > 0, IEˆ z(˜ g,k) < 0, SEˆ y(˜ g,k) > 0, and IEˆ y(˜ g,k) > 0.
(6.34)
At a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium emission outcome  ∗ z1,..., ∗ zS  of the global economy
where k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kS, we have ∗ z1 ≥ ∗ z2 ≥ ... ≥ ∗ zS.
Theorem (NO-FUEL-COSTk) and (6.27) imply that the MRS, −uz
uy, increases as
capital increases. This is because as capital increases, it substitutes out the fuel input.
Diminishing returns to fuel implies that the net marginal product of fuel increases. The
emission intensity is constant in this model. Hence, the trade-oﬀ in production and hence
consumption between intended production and emission generation rises. The substitution
eﬀect, thus, implies an increase in levels of both emissions and intended output. However,
an increase in capital also implies an increase in real income by an amount fk (see Theorem
(INC&SUBST-EFFECTSz,y) and note that φk = 0 in this case). The inferiority of the
emission and normality of the intended output in consumption imply that the income eﬀect
of a change in capital on emission (resp., intended output) is negative (resp., positive).
(6.34) shows that the net eﬀect of these two eﬀects on emission is negative, while on
intended output is positive. This is illustrated with the help of preferences seen in Figure
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16, where the substitution eﬀects are indicated by a movement from point A to point
B, while the income eﬀects are indicated by a movement from point B to point C. If
there are no diminishing returns, then there are no substitution eﬀects and no changes
in the MRS as capital levels change. Thus, function ˆ z is non-increasing in capital and
Theorem (NON-COOP-NASH k,z RELATION) implies that at a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, capital-rich countries generate lesser emissions and consume more intended
output than capital-poor countries. The reduction in emissions as we move to countries
with more and more capital is brought about by reductions in the usage of the fuel input
and increases in the cleaning-up levels.
6.5.2. The case of the complementarity between capital and fuel inputs.
In this special case, we continue with the assumption of one emission-causing in-
put. But capital is now assumed to be fuel intensive: φk > 0 with φkk = 0. In





yfxzxz−(haaα2−fxzxzθ2)]. Thus, ∂ˆ a
∂k is greater than zero if fk − φkfxz is non-
negative and has an ambiguous sign otherwise. Thus, (6.27) implies that, as capital
increases, the MRS, −uz
uy , increases when fk −φkfxz is greater than zero, while the sign of
the change in MRS is indeterminate for fk−φkfxz less than zero. Theorem (INC&SUBST-
EFFECTSz,y) thus implies that the sign of the substitution eﬀects of a change in capital
on emission and intended output levels is ambiguous when fk − φkfxz is less than zero.
On the other hand, this theorem also implies that, under Assumptions (INFERIORz) and
(NORMALy),
IEˆ z(˜ g,k) ≤ 0 if and only if fk − φkfxz ≥ 0 and
IEˆ y(˜ g,k) ≥ 0 if and only if fk − φkfxz ≥ 0.
(6.35)
It can be shown that, when fk − φkfxz ≥ 0, the income eﬀects dominate the substitution
eﬀects, so that as capital increases, emission level decreases and intended output increases.
Note, fk − φkfxz is the increase in the real income due to a change in capital. This is the
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net marginal product of capital: the contribution of additional capital input to intended
production net of the extraction cost of fuel needed to run the additional capital. Let us
assume fkk > 0, i.e., there are increasing returns to capital, an assumption which may
not be considered unacceptable for an input such as capital. Under our sign conventions,
φkfxz is constant in k.43 Hence, fk − φkfxz is an increasing function of k. For low levels
of capital, it could well be negative, i.e., increasing returns to capital may not be strong
enough yet to oﬀset the loss in output incurred by diverting fuel inputs towards running
the capital: the operation of capital equipment is hence a net drain on the economy’s
resources. As capital level rises, the eﬀect of increasing returns becomes stronger and the
net marginal product of capital turns positive. If (i) increasing returns to capital is true,
(ii) the net marginal product of capital takes negative values for low levels of capital and
positive values for high levels of capital, and (iii) the substitution eﬀects are negligible
then the function ˆ z has a maximum, and Theorem (NON-COOP-NASH k,z RELATION)
implies that an environmental Kuznets curve phenomenon arises at a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium: there is an inverse U (resp., U) shape relation between capital and emission
(resp., intended output) levels.
Theorem (ENV-KUZNETS-CURVE): Suppose speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7) of the
global economy hold, nz = 1, φk > 0, φkk = 0, haa = 0, the solution mapping Φ of (6.4) is


















= uy [fk − φkfxz].
(6.36)
43 Recall, we have assumed fxzk = 0 and φkk = 0.
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If, in addition, fkk > 0 and there exists a
∗
k such that, evaluated at Φ(˜ g,
∗
k), fk −φkfxz = 0




















































If (6.37) is true globally for all k ∈ (0,ρ) then, at a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
emission outcome  ∗ z1,..., ∗ zS  of the global economy where k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ... ≤ kS, (ii) of
Theorem (NON-COOP-NASH k,z RELATION) holds.
The appearance of an environmental Kuznets curve at a non-cooperative Nash equi-
librium in our analysis, implies that there exists a critical level
∗
k of capital such that
countries with capital endowment less than the critical amount cannot reap dividends
from increasing returns to capital. Rather, in such countries, a large amount of resources
have to be diverted away from intended production towards extraction of fuel needed for
running the capital so that the net marginal product of capital is negative.
Example 2.
We now present a numerical example to demonstrate the environmental Kuznets
curve. Suppose the following are true:




+ [˜ g + z],
f(xz,l,k) = k2 + l + log(xz + 1),
h(a,y) = a + y,
¯ L = 100, α =, θ = 8, c =
1
2
,and φk = 2.
(6.38)
Thus, we obtain uz





∂k = 0 and substitution eﬀects of a change in capital are all zero. (6.16)
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implies 1
xz+1 − c = α
θ, from which we derive xz = ˆ x(˜ g,k) = 1
7. fk − φkfxz = 2k − 2
7, so
that solving fk − φkfxz = 0 yields
∗
k = 7
8. Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions of (6.4) for
functions ˆ y and ˆ z, we obtain





































Figure 17 plots function ˆ z, while Figure 18 plots function ˆ y. The horizontal axes of both





∂k = 0, ∂ˆ z
∂k =
0, ∂2ˆ z
∂k2 < 0, and
∂2ˆ y
∂k2 > 0.
6.5.3. The case of inter-fuel substitution.
We assume that there are two fuel inputs and that the use of capital is not fuel
intensive. WOLOG assume that fuel input 1 is dirtier than fuel input 2, i.e., α1 > α2.
We ﬁnd below that two factors determine the relative usage of the two fuels: their relative
emission intensities and their relative labour costs of extraction.
We assume that what matters for intended production is the total energy generated
from the use of fuel inputs. The energy generated by employing xz1 and xz2 amounts of
fuel inputs 1 and 2 is the function: ψ : R2
+ −→ R+ with image ψ(xz1,xz2). Deﬁne the
function F : R3
+ −→ R+ with image
F(ψ(xz1,xz2),l,k) ≡ f(xz,l,k), Fψ > 0, Fψψ = 0, Fψl = 0 Fψk = 0
=⇒ fxzi = Fψψxzi ∀ i = 1,2.
(6.40)












, where σ  = 1 is the inter-fuel elasticity of substitution.
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and ψxzi is homogeneous of degree zero

























(6.15), (6.16), and (6.40) imply that the trade-oﬀs between emission and intended



























= fl [c1α2 − c2α1]. (6.42)




implicit function of c1. It is independent of k. In fact, the following theorem shows that
xz2
xz1
is an increasing function of c1 if σ > 0. In particular, note that if c1 > c2, then the ﬁrst
fuel is both more costly to extract and more emission intensive than the second fuel. This







α1 < 1. Hence,
xz2
xz1
> 1, i.e., the second fuel input is used more intensively
than the ﬁrst. Since ψxz1 and ψxz2 are functions of
xz2
xz1
, the optimal value of which is






i.e., there are no substitution eﬀects of a change in capital.
Theorem (INTER-FUEL-SUBST): Suppose speciﬁcations (G1) to (G7) of the global
economy hold, nz = 2, φ(k) = 0 for all k, α1 > α2, the solution mapping Φ of (6.4)
is a diﬀerentiable function, ψ is a CES function, and Assumptions (INFERIORz) and
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α2 such that if 1  = σ > 0 then, for any k > 0,
xz2
xz1
(c1,k) < 1 if c1 < ∗ c1,
= 1 if c1 = ∗ c1, and
> 1 if c1 > ∗ c1,
and SEˆ y(˜ g,k) = 0 and SEˆ z(˜ g,k) = 0.
Example 3.
Figure 19 considers the case when σ = 2, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, c2 = 2 and plots the
relation between c1 and the optimal value of
xz2
xz1







13 − 6c1 + c2
1 + (c1 − 3)
 




In this case, ∗ c1 = 2. For c1 ≤ ∗ c, the dirtier fuel has a suﬃcient cost advantage and hence
is used relatively more than the cleaner input, while if c1 > ∗ c then the dirtier fuel does
not have suﬃcient cost advantage to warranty a greater share relative to the cleaner input
in the production of energy.
7. Conclusions.
The reduced form approach that is commonly adopted in the literature to model
emission-generating technologies does not distinguish between emission-causing and non-
emission causing goods. It can miss out on interesting insights regarding how emissions
are actually reduced when countries undertake abatement measures. Further, as pointed
out in MRL, it can also result in intuitively unacceptable trade-oﬀs in production between
various goods. Here, we provide a new set of axioms to describe emission-generating tech-
nologies. Technologies that satisfy these axioms are called by-production technologies. We
derive a distance function representation of by-production technologies and show that such
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a technology can be decomposed into a standard neo-classical intended-production tech-
nology and nature’s emission generation set. Hence, the by-production approach extends
neo-classical theory of production to incorporate the link in nature between emissions and
emission-causing goods.
We believe that the by-production approach can yield rich results in both applied
and theoretical works concerned with emission generation. As an illustrative application,
we employ it to study cross-country diﬀerences in emission levels at a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium of a global economy. One of the agendas of environmental economics
is to test whether economic growth is an engine of environmental consciousness. Our
model (even though it is only a static one with many simplifying assumptions) of a global
economy suggests that it could be. Moreover, it demonstrates a self-correcting force for the
basic global environmental externality problem: environmental consciousness can increase
even in the absence of any international environmental regulator as countries which were
initially resource-poor begin to accumulate certain key inputs such as capital. It is not
the diﬀerences in preferences for cleaner environment between rich and poor countries
that explains high emission levels of developing countries. We believe all countries value
clean environment: emission is perceived as an inferior good by all countries. Diﬀerences
in emission levels depend on the income and substitution eﬀects generated by diﬀerences
in their productive capacities. Some countries are forced to make dirtier technological
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem (BP):
(i) Let y ∈ Y(x,a). Under the maintained assumptions, there exists z ∈ Rm′
+ and  ¯ y, ¯ z  ∈
Rm+m′
+ such that y ∈ P(x,a,z) and ¯ y ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a, ¯ z). Choose ˆ z such that ˆ z ≥ z
and ˆ z ≥ ¯ z. Then Remark 1 implies that y ∈ P(x,a, ˆ z) and ¯ y ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a, ˆ z) and
(CFDxz,a) implies that P(x,a, ˆ z) ⊂ P(¯ x,¯ a, ˆ z). Hence, y ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a, ˆ z). Remark 2
implies y ∈ Y(¯ x,¯ a).
(ii) Let ¯ z ∈ Z(¯ x,¯ a). Under the maintained assumptions, there exists ¯ y ∈ Rm
+ and  y,z  ∈
Rm+m′
+ such that ¯ z ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a, ¯ y) and z ∈ P(x,a,y). Choose ˆ y such that ˆ y ≤ y
and ˆ y ≤ ¯ y. Then Remark 1, (FDo), and (FDyz) imply that z ∈ P(x,a, ˆ y) and
¯ z ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a, ˆ y). (CCDxz,a) implies that P(¯ x,¯ a, ˆ y) ⊂ P(x,a, ˆ y). Hence, ¯ z ∈ P(x,a, ˆ y).
Hence, ¯ z ∈ Z(x,a).
THEOREM (IP)
Lemma (IND-IPz) is used to prove Theorem (IP). We state and prove this Lemma below
before proving Theorem (IP).
Lemma (IND-IPz): Suppose Assumptions (C), (INDz), (FDo), and (FDyz) hold.
Suppose  x,a  ∈ Ω and  y,z  ∈ P(x,a) are such that 1
κ y,z  / ∈ P(x,a) for all
κ ∈ (0,1). Then, for all z′ ∈ Rm′
+ and κ′ ∈ (0,1), we have  
y
κ′,z′  / ∈ P(x,a).
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exist κ′ ∈ (0,1) and z′ ∈ Rm′
+ such that  
y
κ′,z′  ∈ P(x,a).
This implies
y
κ′ ∈ P(x,a,z′). Choose ˆ κ such that κ′ ≤ ˆ κ < 1 and z
ˆ κ ∈ Z(x,a).
Then (FDo) and (FDyz) imply that
y






ˆ κ ∈ P(x,a, z
ˆ κ), i.e.,  
y
ˆ κ, z
ˆ κ  ∈ P(x,a), which is a contradiction to the maintained
assumptions.
Proof of Theorem (IP):
(i) Let  x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω × Rm+m′
+ . Then from (C) and from the deﬁnition of Ω, it follows that
T  = ∅ and P(x,a)  = ∅.
• Suppose Λ1(x,a,y,z) = ∅. Then, by its deﬁnition, D1(x,a,y,z) = ∞.
• Suppose Λ1(x,a,y,z)  = ∅. Then (BOUNDy) and (C) imply that this set is compact.
Hence, D1(x,a,y,z) is well deﬁned and unique.
(ii)  x,a,y,z  ∈ T implies that 1 ∈ Λ1(x,a,y,z). Hence, from its deﬁnition, D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1.




P(x,a). (FDo), (FDyz), and λ1 ≤ 1 imply that  λ1
y
λ1, z
λ1  =  y, z
λ1  ∈ P(x,a).
(iii)
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• D1 is homogeneous of degree one in y and z:
D1(x,a,κy,κz) := inf {λ1 > 0
 




















  ∈ P(x,a)}
= κ D1(x,a,y,z)
• D1 is convex in y and z: Need to show
D1(x,a,α¯ y + (1 − α)ˆ y,α¯ z + (1 − α)ˆ z) ≤ αD1(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) + (1 − α)D1(x,a, ˆ y, ˆ z) for
α ∈ [0,1]. Let ¯ λ1 = D1(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) and ˆ λ1 = D1(x,a, ˆ y, ˆ z).
The deﬁnition of D1 implies 1
¯ λ ¯ y, ¯ z  ∈ P(x,a) and 1
ˆ λ ˆ y, ˆ z  ∈ P(x,a). Deﬁne
∗ α = α¯ λ1
α¯ λ1+(1−α)ˆ λ1
. Then (1− ∗ α) =
(1−α)ˆ λ1
α¯ λ1+(1−α)ˆ λ1
and ∗ α ∈ [0,1]. Assumption (C) implies
 ∗ α
¯ y
¯ λ1 + (1 − ∗ α)
ˆ y
ˆ λ1
, ∗ α ¯ z
¯ λ1 + (1 − ∗ α) ˆ z
ˆ λ1
  ∈ P(x,a).
But  ∗ α
¯ y
¯ λ1 + (1 − ∗ α)
ˆ y
ˆ λ1
, ∗ α ¯ z
¯ λ1 + (1 − ∗ α) ˆ z
ˆ λ1







Hence, α¯ λ1 + (1 − α)ˆ λ1 ∈ Λ1(x,a,α¯ y + (1 − α)ˆ y,α¯ z + (1 − α)ˆ z).
Hence, D1(x,a,α¯ y + (1 − α)ˆ y,α¯ z + (1 − α)ˆ z) ≤ α¯ λ1 + (1 − α)ˆ λ1 = αD1(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) +
(1 − α)D1(x,a, ˆ y, ˆ z) for all α ∈ [0,1].
• D1 is non-decreasing in y: Let D1(x,a,y,z) ≡ λ1, ¯ y > y and D1(x,a, ¯ y,z) ≡ ¯ λ1. Then,
the deﬁnition of D1 implies that  
¯ y
¯ λ1, z
¯ λ1  ∈ P(x,a) and  
y
λ1, z




¯ λ1. (FDo) and (FDyz) imply  
y
¯ λ1, z
¯ λ1  ∈ P(x,a). Hence, ¯ λ1 ∈ Λ1(x,a,y,z).
Hence, D1(x,a,y,z) = λ1 ≤ ¯ λ1 = D1(x,a, ¯ y,z).
• D1 is non-increasing in x and non-decreasing in a: Let D1(x,a,y,z) ≡ λ1. Let ¯ x ≥ x
and ¯ a ≤ a such that  ¯ x,¯ a  ∈ Ω and  ¯ x,¯ a   =  x,a . (C) and the deﬁnition of Ω imply
that P(¯ x,¯ a)  = ∅. Three cases are possible:
Case 1. Λ1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z) = ∅: Then, D1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z) is not well deﬁned.
Case 2. Λ1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z)  = ∅ and z
λ1 ∈ Z(¯ x,¯ a): Hence, there exists y′ ∈ Rm
+
such that  y′, z
λ1  ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a). Thus, P(¯ x,¯ a, z
λ1)  = ∅. Hence, (CFDxz,a) implies
P(x,a, z
λ1) ⊂ P(¯ x,¯ a, z
λ1). Hence,  
y
λ1, z
λ1  ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a). Hence, λ1 ∈ Λ1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z). Hence,
D1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z) ≤ λ1.
Case 3. Λ1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z)  = ∅ and z
λ1 / ∈ Z(¯ x,¯ a): From Remark 2 and Lemma (BP), it fol-
lows that Z(¯ x,¯ a) ⊂ Z(¯ x,¯ a) ⊂ Z(x,a). Remark 1 implies that Z(¯ x,¯ a) = Z(¯ x,¯ a)+Rm′
+ .
Hence, z
λ1 < z′ for all z′ ∈ Z(¯ x,¯ a). Since, Z(¯ x,¯ a) ⊂ Z(¯ x,¯ a), z
λ1 < z′ for all
z′ ∈ Z(¯ x,¯ a). Hence, λ′
1 ≤ λ1 for all λ′
1 ∈ Λ1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z). Hence, D1(¯ x,¯ a,y,z) ≤ λ1.
• D1 is constant in z if (INDz) holds: Choose ¯ z  = z such that D1(x,a,y,z) ≡ λ1 and




(INDz) implies P(x,a, z
λ1) = P(x,a, ¯ z
λ1). Hence,  
y
λ1, ¯ z
λ1) ∈ P(x,a). Hence, λ1 ∈




λ1  / ∈ P(x,a)
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for all κ ∈ (0,1). Suppose ¯ λ1 < λ1. Then, 1
¯ λ1 y, ¯ z  =  
y
λ1
κ′ , ¯ z
¯ λ1  ∈ P(x,a), where
κ′ ≡
¯ λ1
λ1 ∈ (0,1). This contradicts the conclusions of Lemma (IND-IPz), which are
true under the maintained assumptions. Hence, λ1 = ¯ λ1.
• D1 is non-decreasing in z if (DETz) holds: Choose ¯ z > z such that D1(x,a,y,z) ≡ λ1 and
D1(x,a,y, ¯ z) ≡ ¯ λ1 are well deﬁned. The deﬁnition of D1 implies that ¯ z
¯ λ1 ∈ P(x,a,
y
¯ λ1).
(DETz) implies P(x,a, ¯ z
¯ λ1) ⊂ P(x,a, z
¯ λ1). Hence,  
y
¯ λ1, z
¯ λ1) ∈ P(x,a). Hence, ¯ λ1 ∈
Λ1(x,a,y,z). Hence, λ1 ≤ ¯ λ1.
• D1 is non-increasing in z if (BENz) holds: Choose ¯ z > z such that D1(x,a,y,z) ≡ λ1 and




(BENz) implies P(x,a, z
λ1) ⊂ P(x,a, ¯ z
λ1). Hence,  
y
λ1, ¯ z
λ1) ∈ P(x,a). Hence, λ1 ∈
Λ1(x,a,y, ¯ z). Hence, ¯ λ1 ≤ λ1.
(iv) D1 is continuous in its arguments: Proof is similar to the continuity of the output distance
function in F¨ are and Primont [1995].
THEOREM (EG)
Lemma (IND-EGo) is used to prove Theorem (EG). We state and prove this Lemma below
before proving Theorem (EG).
Lemma (IND-EGo): Suppose Assumptions (C), (FDo), and (INDo) hold. Suppose
 x,a  ∈ Ω and  yz,yo,z  ∈ P(x,a) are such that κ yz,yo,z  / ∈ P(x,a) for all
κ ∈ [0,1). Then, for all  x′
o,y′
o  ∈ Rno+mo
+ and κ′ ∈ [0,1), we have  κ′yz,y′
o,κ′z  / ∈
P(xz,x′
o,a).
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exist κ′ ∈ [0,1) and  x′
o,y′
o  ∈ Rno+mo
+ such that
 κ′yz,y′
o,κ′z  ∈ P(xz,x′
o,a). This implies κ′ yz,z  ∈ P(xz,x′
o,a,y′
o). (INDo) implies
κ′ yz,z  ∈ P(x,a,yo). (FDo) implies κ′ yz,yo,z  ∈ P(x,a), which is a contradiction
to the maintained assumptions.
Proof of Theorem (EG):
(i) Let  x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω × Rm+1
+ . Then from (C) and from the deﬁnition of Ω, P(x,a)  = ∅.
• If Λ2(x,a,y,z) = ∅ then D2(x,a,y,z) = ∞.
• If Λ2(x,a,y,z)  = ∅, then from Remark 1, P(x,a) is bounded from below. Hence, the
set Λ2(x,a,y,z) has a lower-bound. Hence, it has a greatest lower bound. Hence,
D2(x,a,y,z) is well deﬁned.
(ii)  x,a,y,z  ∈ T ⇒ D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1:  x,a,y,z  ∈ T implies  y,z  ∈ P(x,a). Hence,
1 ∈ Λ2(x,a,y,z). Hence, D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1.
(iii)
• Proofs of linear-homogeneity and convexity of D2 in y and z are similar to Part (iii) of
Theorem (IP).
• D2 is non-increasing in z and non-decreasing in yz: Let D2(x,a,y,z) = λ2, ¯ yz ≤ yz,
¯ z ≥ z, and D2(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z) = ¯ λ2. From the deﬁnition of D2 it follows that  λ2y,λ2z  ∈
P(x,a). (FDyz), (FDyo), and Remark 1 imply that  λ2¯ y,λ2¯ z  ∈ P(x,a). Hence,
λ2 ∈ Λ2(x,a, ¯ y, ¯ z). Hence, ¯ λ2 ≤ λ2.
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• D2 is non-decreasing in x and non-increasing in a: Let D2(x,a,y,z) ≡ λ2. Let ¯ x ≥ x
and ¯ a ≤ a such that  ¯ x,¯ a  ∈ Ω and  ¯ x,¯ a   =  x,a . (C) and deﬁnition of Ω imply that
P(x,a)  = ∅. Three cases are possible:
Case 1. Λ2(x,a,y,z) = ∅: Then, D2(x,a,y,z) is not well deﬁned.
Case 2. Λ2(x,a,y,z)  = ∅ and ¯ λ2y ∈ Y(x,a): Hence there exists z′ ∈ R+ such that
 ¯ λ2y,z′  ∈ P(x,a). Choose ˆ z such that ˆ z ≥ z′ and ˆ z ≥ ¯ λ2z. Then, Remark 1 implies
that  ¯ λ2y, ˆ z  ∈ P(x,a) and  ¯ λ2y, ˆ z  ∈ P(¯ x,¯ a). (CCDxz,a) and (FDo) imply that
P(¯ x,¯ a, ¯ λ2y) ⊂ P(x,a, ¯ λ2y). Hence,  ¯ λ2y, ¯ λ2z  ∈ P(x,a). Hence, ¯ λ2 ∈ Λ2(x,a,y,z).
Hence, D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ ¯ λ2.
Case 3. Λ2(x,a,y,z)  = ∅ and ¯ λ2y / ∈ Y(x,a): From Lemma (BP), it follows that
Y(x,a) ⊂ Y(¯ x,¯ a). (FDo) and (FDyz) imply that Y(x,a) = Y(x,a) − Rm
+. Hence,
¯ λ2y > y′ for all y′ ∈ Y(x,a). Hence, λ′
2 ≤ λ2 for all λ′
2 ∈ Λ2(x,a,y,z). Hence,
D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ ¯ λ2.
• D2 is constant in yo and xo: Proof employs Lemma (IND-EGo) and is similar to the
proving that D1 is constant in z when (INDz) holds in Part (iii) of Theorem (IP).
(iv) D2 is continuous in its arguments: Proof is similar to the continuity of the input distance
function in F¨ are and Primont [1995].
Proof of Theorem (BP-REPR):
(=⇒) Follows directly from Parts (ii) of Theorems (IP) and (EG).
(⇐=) We show that  x,a,y,z  / ∈ T implies D1(x,a,y,z) > 1 or D2(x,a,y,z) > 1.
• Suppose  x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω×Rm+m′
+ is such that λ2 ≡ D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1 and  x,a,y,z  / ∈ T .
We show that this implies D1(x,a,y,z) > 1. By deﬁnition of D2,  λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a).
Case 1.  λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a): We claim that if κ ∈ R+ is such that 1
κ y,z  ∈ P(x,a)
then κ > 1. Suppose not. Then there exists κ ∈ (0,1) such that 1
κ y,z  ∈ P(x,a).
Hence, λ2 y,z  ≪  y,z  ≪ 1
κ y,z . From (C), it follows that P(x,a) is convex and
hence  y,z  can be written as a convex combination of λ2 y,z  and 1
κ y,z . Hence,
 y,z  ∈ P(x,a), which is a contradiction. Hence, κ > 1 for all κ ∈ Λ1(x,a,y,z). Hence
D1(x,a,y,z) > 1.
Case 2.  λ2y,λ2z   ∈ P(x,a): Assumption (∗) implies κ λ2y,λ2z   ∈ P(x,a) for all
κ ≥ 1. Further, if there exists κ ∈ [0,1) such that κ λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a), then
Remark 1 implies κ λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a) with κλ2 < λ2, which is a contradiction
to λ2 = D2(x,a,y,z). Hence, Λ1(x,a,y,z) = ∅. Hence, D1(x,a,y,z) = ∞ > 1.
• Suppose  x,a,y,z  ∈ Ω×Rm+m′
+ is such that λ1 ≡ D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1 and  x,a,y,z  / ∈ T .
We show that this implies D2(x,a,y,z) > 1. By deﬁnition of D1,  
y
λ1, z
λ1  ∈ P(x,a).
Hence, from our maintained assumptions, it follows that  y,z  ≤ 1
λ1 y,z . Let
λ2 ≡ D2(x,a,y,z).
Case 1.  λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a): We claim that λ2 > 1. Suppose not. Then λ2 ∈ [0,1]
and λ2 y,z  ≤  y,z  ≤ 1
λ1 y,z . From (C), P(x,a) is convex. Hence, this implies that
 y,z  is a convex combination of λ2 y,z  and 1
λ1 y,z  and hence is in P(x,a), which
is a contradiction.
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Case 2.  λ2y,λ2z   ∈ P(x,a): Since λ1 ≤ 1,  λ2y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a), and 1
λ1 y,z  =
1




Hence, λ2 > 1.
Proof of Theorem (BP-DECOMP):
• T = T1 ∩ T2 follows from the conclusions of Theorem (BP-REPR).
• For k = 1,...,m′, D2k is well deﬁned whenever  x,a  ∈ Ω, z−k ∈ Z−k(x,a,y), and
Λ2k(x,a,y,zk,z−k) ≡ {λ2k > 0
    λ2kzk ∈ P(x,a,y,z−k)}  = ∅. It is obvious that,
under (Jz) and (INDo) with mz = 0, D2k is constant in z−k and y whenever  x,a  ∈ Ω
and z−k ∈ Z−k(x,a,y).
• Let  x,a,y,zk,z−k  ∈ T2. Hence, for all k = 1,...,m, P(x,a,y,z−k)  = ∅ and Remark 1
implies that Z−k(x,a,y)  = ∅. The deﬁnition of T2 implies, λ2 ≡ D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1.
The deﬁnition of D2 implies that for all k = 1,...,m′, λ2zk ∈ P(x,a,λ2y,λ2z−k).
(Jz) implies λ2zk ∈ P(x,a,λ2y,z−k). From Theorem (EG), (INDo) and mz = 0 im-
ply D2 is constant in y. Hence, λ2zk ∈ P(x,a,y,z−k). Hence, the deﬁnition of D2k
implies D2k(x,a,y,zk,z−k) ≤ λ2 ≤ 1 for all k = 1,...,m′. Hence,  x,a,y,zk,z−k  ∈
 m′
k=1 T2k.
Let  x,a,y,zk,z−k  ∈
 m′
k=1 T2k. Then for all k = 1,...,m′, λ2k ≡ D2k(x,a,y,zk,z−k) ≤
1. The deﬁnition of D2k implies λ2kzk ∈ P(x,a,y,z−k). Hence, Remark 1 implies
1
λ2kλ2kzk = zk ∈ P(x,a,y,z−k).
Proof of Theorem (BP-EFFICIENCY): Suppose at least one of D1(x,a,y,z) or
D2(x,a,y,z) is not equal to 1.
Case 1: At least one of D1(x,a,y,z) or D2(x,a,y,z) is greater than 1: Theorem (BP-
REPR) implies  x,a,y,z   ∈ T and hence  x,a,y,z  is not a strictly eﬃcient point of T .
Case 2: Suppose λ1 ≡ D1(x,a,y,z) < 1 and D2(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1: Theorem (BP-
REPR) implies  x,a,y,z  ∈ T .
y
λ1 > y and z
λ1 > z. If T is a SBP technology,
then (INDz) is true and P(x,a,z) = P(x,a, z
λ1). If T is a DETBPT, then (DETz)
is true and P(x,a, z
λ1) ⊂ P(x,a,z). Hence, in either case,  
y
λ1,z  ∈ P(x,a). Thus,
 x,a,
y
λ1,z  ∈ T . Hence,  x,a,y,z  is not a strictly eﬃcient point of T .
Case 3: Suppose λ2 ≡ D2(x,a,y,z) < 1 and D1(x,a,y,z) ≤ 1: Theorem (BP-REPR)
implies  x,a,y,z  ∈ T . λ2y < y and λ2z < z. Since T is a BPT and mz = 0, (INDo) is
true and P(x,a,y) = P(x,a,λ2y). Hence,  y,λ2z  ∈ P(x,a). Thus,  x,a,y,λ2z  ∈ T .
Hence,  x,a,y,z  is not a strictly eﬃcient point of T .





 xz,l,a,y,z  ∈ R4+nz
++
 
  D1(xz,l,k,a,y) ≤ 1, D2(xz,l,k,a,z) ≤ 1, and
ϕ(xz,l,k) ≤ ¯ L
 
.
Step 1. We show that Φ is non-empty, upper-hemicontinuous, and compact valued:
this follows from Berge’s theorem of the maximum once it can be shown that C is a
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non-empty, continuous, and compact-valued mapping. C is a non-empty and compact-
valued mapping: non-emptiness follows from the deﬁnition of ρ (which deﬁnes the
domain of C) and the functional forms of D1, D2, and ϕ; convexity follows from the
concavity and hence quasi-concavity of D1 and D2 and the linearity of ϕ for any ﬁxed
value of k; and compactness follows from (i) the continuity of the functions deﬁning
all constraints of (6.4) and (ii) the boundedness of the labour resource at ¯ L and the
capital resource, which implies that the quantities xz, l, y, a, and z are bounded for
a given k.
We now show that C is also a continuous mapping. Upper-hemicontinuity of C follows
from the continuity of D1, D2, and the linear function deﬁning the third constraint of
(6.4). To prove lower-hemicontinuity of C, note that, C is constant in ˜ g. Consider any
sequence { ˜ gν,kν } →  ˜ g,¯ k  and let  ¯ xz,¯ l,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z  ∈ C(˜ g,¯ k). Two cases are possible:
Case 1. All of the following are true: D1(¯ xz,¯ l,¯ k,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z) < 1, D2(¯ xz,¯ l,¯ k,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z) < 1, and
ϕ(¯ l, ¯ xz,¯ k) < ¯ L: Consider the sequence { xν
z,lν,aν,yν,zν } →  ¯ xz,¯ l,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z , where,
for all ν, xν
z = ¯ xz, lν = ¯ l, aν = ¯ a, yν = ¯ y, and zν = ¯ z. The continuity of
D1, D2, and ϕ implies that there exists ν′ such that for all ν ≥ ν′, we have
D1(¯ xz,¯ l,kν,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z) < 1, D2(¯ xz,¯ l,kν,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z) < 1, and ϕ(¯ xz,¯ l,kν) < 1. Hence, for
all big enough ν,  xν
z,lν,aν,yν,zν  ∈ C(˜ gν,kν).
Case 2. At least one of the following is true: D1(¯ xz,¯ l,¯ k,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z) = 1, D2(¯ xz,¯ l,¯ k,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z) = 1, or
ϕ(¯ l, ¯ xz,¯ k) = ¯ L: Note, (G3) implies that the function h is quasi-linear. In particular,
it is linear in y, say, h(a,y) ≡ hyy + ¯ h(a). Hence, h(a,y) = f(xz,l,k,y,z) ⇐⇒
y = h−1 (a,f(xz,l,k,z)) ⇐⇒ y = f(xz,l,k,z) − ¯ h(a). Consider the sequence
{ xν
z,lν,aν,yν,zν }, where
• for all ν, xν
z = ¯ xz and aν = ¯ a,
• the sequence {zν} → ¯ z is deﬁned such that, for all ν, zν ≥
 nz
i=1 αi¯ xzi +α1φ(kν)−θ¯ a,44
• the sequence {lν} → ¯ l is deﬁned such that, for all ν, lν ≤ ¯ L − c1φ(kν) −
 nz
i=1 ci¯ xzi,45
• the sequence {yν} → ¯ y is deﬁned such that, for all ν,
yν = ˜ y(kν) ≡ max{y′  
  D1(¯ xz,lν,kν,¯ a,y′,zν) ≤ 1} = f(¯ xz,lν,kν,zν) − ¯ h(¯ a).46
˜ y is a well-deﬁned and continuous function. Note, ˜ y(¯ k) = ¯ y. Thus,  xν
z,lν,aν,yν,zν  ∈
C(˜ gν,zν) and { xν
z,lν,aν,yν,zν } →  ¯ xz,¯ l,¯ a, ¯ y, ¯ z .
Step 2. We claim that ˆ y and ˆ z are continuous functions. Note, ˆ y and ˆ z are unique-valued.
This follows from the fact that u is strictly quasi-concave function and C(˜ g,k) is
a convex set for all  ˜ g,k  ∈ R2
+. (Convexity of C(˜ g,k) follows from the fact that,
for a ﬁxed k, D1 and D2 are concave functions and ϕ is a linear function.) Hence,
upper-hemicontinuity of Φ from Step 1 implies ˆ y and ˆ z are continuous functions.
Proof of Theorem (NON-COOP-NASH k,z RELATION): From the maintained
assumptions of this theorem, for all s = 1,...,S − 1, we have ks ≤ ks+1.
44 Such a sequence exists given the continuity of the function φ.
45 Such a sequence exists given the continuity of the function φ. Also, for big enough ν, lν > 0 as ¯ l > 0.
46 This follows from the fact that D1 is increasing in y and hence yν solves D1(¯ xz,lν,kν,¯ a,yν,zν) = 1.
57The theory of by-production of emissions and capital-constrained non-cooperative Nash outcomes of a global economy. (S. Murty) July 20, 2011
• If ˆ z is non-increasing in k and constant in ˜ g, then
∗ zs ≡ ˆ z(gs(∗ z(−s)),ks) ≥ ˆ z(gs(∗ z(−s)),ks+1) = ˆ z(gs+1(∗ z(−(s+1))),ks+1) ≡ ∗ zs+1.
• If ˆ z is non-decreasing in k and constant in ˜ g, then
∗ zs ≡ ˆ z(gs(∗ z(−s)),ks) ≤ ˆ z(gs(∗ z(−s)),ks+1) = ˆ z(gs+1(∗ z(−(s+1))),ks+1) ≡ ∗ zs+1.
This proves (i) of this theorem. (ii) follows from (i) when we note that, for a ﬁxed ˜ g, ˆ z is
non-decreasing in the interval (0,
∗
k] and non-increasing in the interval [
∗
k,ρ).
Proof of Lemma (COMP-STATICSk, ˜ g): For every  ˜ g,k  ∈ R++ × (0,ρ), Φ satisﬁes



















, ∀ i = 1,...,nz.
Diﬀerentiating (6.14) with respect to k and employing (6.17) we obtain (6.18).
Diﬀerentiating (6.13) with respect to k and employing (6.17) we obtain (6.19).


















(6.20) is obtained from repeatedly employing (6.15) and (6.16) on (A.1). Diﬀerenti-





























(6.21) is obtained from (A.2) by employing (6.19), (6.20), (6.15), and (6.16). Note
that equations (6.7) to (6.16) are all independent of ˜ g.47 Hence, (6.22) is true.
Proof of Lemma (SHADOWp,m): (6.27) follows from diﬀerentiating p(˜ g,k) in (6.25)






















47 The speciﬁcation of u in (G7) implies u is quasi-linear. In particular, it is linear in ˜ g. Hence, uz and
uy are independent of ˜ g.
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z + fk − φkfxz1.
(A.4)
Proof of Theorem (ENV-KUZNETS-CURVE) Since haa = 0, from Lemma
(Shadowp,m) it follows that
∂p(k)
∂k = 0 and
∂m(k)
∂k = fk − φkfxz. The substitution
eﬀects of a change in k are zero, hence (ii) and (iii) of (6.37) reﬂect only the income
eﬀects of a change in k. From the envelope theorem, ∂U
∂k = λfk − δαφk − γcφk. Em-
ploying (6.7) and (6.11) to this, we obtain (iii) of (6.36). From (6.17) it follows that
∂ˆ x
∂k = 0. Hence, at
∗
k, ∂2U
∂k2 = uyfkk > 0.Thus,
∗
k is a (local) minimum of the function
U. Similarly,
∗
k is a (local) minimum (resp., maximum) of the function ˆ y (resp., ˆ z).
59